Dolus eventualis : the subjective test to establish the “reconciliation with the risk” or “the taking into the bargain” of the foreseen result by the accused with specific reference to S v Pistorius. by du Preez, Danie Jan.
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
DOLUS EVENTUALIS : THE SUBJECTIVE TEST TO 
ESTABLISH THE “RECONCILIATION WITH THE RISK” 
OR “THE TAKING INTO THE BARGAIN” OF THE 
FORESEEN RESULT BY THE ACCUSED WITH 
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO S v PISTORIUS 
 
By 
Danie Jan du Preez 
213 573 848 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Master of Criminal Justice 
Graduate School of Law 
Faculty of Law 
 
 








I, Danie Jan du Preez, declare that: 
i. The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise indicated, 
is my original research. 
 
ii. This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at 
any other university. 
 
iii. This dissertation does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or 
other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from 
other persons. 
 
iv. This dissertation does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically 
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers.  Where other written 
sources have been quoted, then: 
a. their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to 
them has been referenced; 
b. where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed 
inside quotation marks, and referenced.  
 
v. Where I have produced a publication of which I am author, co-author or 
editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually 
written by myself alone and have fully referenced such publications. 
 
vi. This dissertation does not contain text, graphics or tables copies and pasted 
from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being 
detailed in the dissertation and in the Reference sections.  
 
 
Signed : …………………………………… 
  
 
DOLUS EVENTUALIS  
The subjective test to establish the reconciliation with the risk or the taking into the 
bargain of the foreseen result by the perpetrator, with specific reference to S v Pistorius 
 
CHAPTER 1  Page 
1. Introduction  1 
 1.1. General 1 
 1.2. Murder versus culpable homicide, including the consideration of 
the subjective and objective tests for fault 
2 
    
CHAPTER 2   
2. Intention  6 
 2.1. Cognitive and conative elements 7 
  2.1.1. Cognitive element 7 
  2.1.2. Conative element 8 
 2.2. Form of intention 9 
  2.2.1. Dolus directus 9 
  2.2.2. Dolus indirectus 10 
  2.2.3. Dolus eventualis 11 
 2.3. Development of dolus eventualis 12 
 2.4. The test for dolus eventualis 18 
  2.4.1. Cognitive element in the test for dolus eventualis 18 
   2.4.1.1. Inferential reasoning in the process of 
establishing subjective foresight 
19 
   2.4.1.2. The degree of foresight required to establish 
dolus eventualis 
24 
  2.4.2. The conative element in the test for dolus eventualis 
namely the reconciliation with the foreseen result or the 
taking into the bargain of the foreseen consequence or 
recklessness towards the foreseen consequence 
30 
    
  
 
CHAPTER 3  
3. S v Pistorius 41 
 3.1. Dolus eventualis and S v Pistorius : the facts of the case and the 
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal judgments considered 
41 
 3.2. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal : Director of Public 
Prosecution v Pistorius 
60 
    
CHAPTER 4  







1.1.  General 
The aim and objective of this dissertation is the dissecting and interpretation of 
dolus eventualis or (legal intent), with reference to the so-called second leg or 
voluntative component of the test to establish the presence of dolus eventualis, 
one of the most important forms of intention in practice in South African Criminal 
Law1  or as put even more strongly by Paizes2 in his statement that there is no 
more fundamental concept in our criminal law than dolus eventualis or legal 
intention. 
 
The concept of dolus eventualis was central in S v Pistorius CC133/2013 (High 
Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division) : a case that involves a human tragedy 
of Shakespearean proportions.3  A young man overcomes huge physical 
disabilities to reach Olympian heights as an athlete, in doing so he becomes an 
international celebrity, he meets a young woman of great natural beauty and a 
successful model; romance blossom and then, ironically on Valentine’s Day, all 
is destroyed, when he takes her life.4 
 
Oscar Leonard Carl Pistorius was charged with four counts.  Count 1 being the 
murder of Reeva Steenkamp to which the accused pleaded not guilty.  Murder is 
defined as the unlawful, intentional killing of another person.5 
 
The accused handed in a plea explanation in terms of Section 15 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.6  Masipa J. made the following extracts from the plea explanation 
in her judgment.7 
 “During the early hours of the morning I brought two fans in from the balcony.  I 
had shortly before spoken to Reeva who was in bed besides me”. 
                                                          
1  S v Hoctor The concept of Dolus Eventualis in South African Law – a Historical Perspective 
Fundamina (14 – 2) 2008 1. 
2  A. Paizes 1988 SALJ Dolus Eventualis Reconsidered 636. 
3  Director of Public Prosecutions v Oscar Leonard Pistorius (96/2015) [2015] ZASCA 204 (3 
December 2015). 
4  http://politicsweb.co.za/documents/gauteng-dpp-vs-oscar-pistorius-sca-judgment. 
5  Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 3rd Edition 2005 157. 
6 Act 51 of 1977 as amended. 
7 S v Pistorius (CC113/2013).  [2014] ZAG PPHC (12 September 2014). 
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 “Unknown to me Reeva must have gone to the toilet in the bathroom at the time when 
I brought in the fans, closed the sliding doors and drew the blinds and the curtains.” 
 “I heard the bathroom window sliding open.  I believed that an intruder or intruders 
had entered the bathroom through the bathroom window which was not fitted with 
burglar bars.” 
 “I approached the bathroom armed with my firearm so as to defend Reeva.  At the 
time I believed Reeva was still in bed.” 
 “The discharging of my firearm was precipitated by a noise in the toilet.  I, in my 
fearful state, knowing that I was on my stumps, unable to run away or properly defend 
myself physically, believed it to be the intruder or intruders coming out of the toilet 
to attack Reeva and me.” 
 
Masipa J. continues, in the judgment,8 to summarise the common cause facts as 
follows:9 
 “the accused while on his stumps fired four shots at the toilet door.” 
 “at the time the shots were fired the deceased was inside the toilet.” 
 “the door of the toilet opened to the outside, that is into the bathroom.” 
 “three of the four shots struck the deceased.’’ 
 “the deceased died of multiple gunshot wounds.’’ 
 
1.2. Murder versus culpable homicide, including the consideration of the subjective 
and objective tests for fault.  
South African law draws a basic distinction between intentional killing (murder) 
and negligent killing (culpable homicide).10   Making this distinction between 
intentional and negligent killing has an attractive simplicity but it also means that 
the South African law regards murder as including both a killing where death was 
merely foreseen as a possibility as well as the typical case of murder, where the 
killing was premeditated. 
 
In Grotjohn 11 the court stated that a person who assists another in committing 
suicide could be found guilty of murder if the assistance to the deceased was 
                                                          
8  Ibid. 
9  S v Pistorius (note 7 above) 3388. 
10  J Burchell (note 5 above) 157. 
11  S v Grotjohn 1970(2) SA 355 (A). 
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unlawful and intentional.  The required principal of unlawfulness and intention 
was confirmed in Hartmann.12 
 
Culpable homicide is the unlawful negligent killing of another human being.13  
The test to prove negligence is an objective test, measured against the conduct of 
the reasonable person.  In other words, would the reasonable person have taken 
steps to guard against the consequences? 
 
The difference between murder and culpable homicide is that between homicide 
with intent and homicide due to negligence, which means the difference between 
dolus and culpa.14 
 
Intent in murder cases must be accompanied by unlawfulness and a 
comprehension and consciousness of unlawfulness. 
 
Snyman15 identifies the elements of the crime of murder as (a) causing death (b) 
of another human being (c) unlawfully and (d) intentional and that of the crime of 
culpable homicide as (a) causing the death (b) of another person (c) unlawfully 
and (d) negligently. 
 
The difference therefore between murder and culpable homicide is the form of 
fault, culpability (negligence) is required for culpable homicide, dolus (intention) 
is required for murder. 
 
The rules relating to the element of intention which is required for murder will be 
discussed in more detail hereunder, but can be summarised as follows:  The 
intention required is satisfied not only if X has the direct intention (dolus directus) 
to kill Y, but also if he merely foresees the possibility of Y being killed and 
reconciles himself to this possibility (dolus eventualis ).16 
 
                                                          
12  S v Hartmann 1975(3) SA 532 (C). 
13 Burchell (note 5 above) 159. 
14  J Kriegler & A Kruger Hiemstra . Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 2ed (2002) 258. 
15  C.R. Snyman Strafreg 5th ed (2008) 447. 
16  Snyman (note 15 above) 449. 
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In Ndhlovu17 it was stated that the state, in a charge or murder, must prove not 
only the killing but that the killing was unlawful and intentional.  The state can 
discharge the onus either by direct evidence or by the proof of facts from which a 
necessary inference may be drawn.  One such fact from which such inference may 
be drawn is the lack of an acceptable explanation by the accused.18 
 
In Sigwahla19 Holmes JA makes the distinction between subjective foresight and 
objective foreseeability and states that “the distinction must be observed between 
what actually went on in the mind of the accused and what would have gone on 
in the mind of a bonus pater familias in the position of the accused.”20  Thus for 
the state to discharge the onus of proof of intent, which is required for a murder 
conviction, the subjective test should be applied and “the distinction between 
subjective foresight and objective foreseeability must not become blurred.  The 
factum probandum is dolus, not culpa.  The two concepts never coincide.21 
 
Holmes JA confirms, with reference to culpable homicide, in Ntuli22 that culpa is 
an essential element of this crime and if an accused’s defence is reasonable, both 
in its application of force and his intention to apply are lawful, then there is no 
dolus on the accused’s part.  Dolus consists of an intention to do an unlawful act.  
The Ntuli23 case revolves around the excessive use of force in self-defence or 
private defence.  If an accused ought reasonably to realise that he is using more 
force than is necessary to protect himself and he ought reasonably to foresee the 
possibility of the resilient death and death ensues, such person will be guilty of 
culpable homicide.  If however, the accused realises that he is using more force 
than is necessary, then he is both applying force unlawfully and intending to do 
this and will be guilty of murder.  The question on the use of excessive force is a 
question of fact, involving an enquiry into the state of mind of the accused.  An 
accused is guilty of culpable homicide if he ought reasonably to have foreseen the 
                                                          
17  R v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369 at 386. 
18  Snyman (note 15 above) 447. 
19 S v Sigwahla 1967(4) SA 566 (A) 570 B – F. 
20  Ibid 570. 
21  S v Pepenene 1974(1) All SA 152 (0). 
22  S v Ntuli 1975(1) SA 429 (A) 436. 
23  Ibid 436.  
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possibility of the resultant death24 and guilty of murder if he foresaw the 
possibility of such resultant death but persisted, regardless whether it ensued or 
not25.  Intention in the form of dolus eventualis or legal intention is present.   
 
  
                                                          
24  S v Bernardus 1965(3) SA 287 (A). 




2. INTENTION (DOLUS) 
The mere fact that a person has committed an act which corresponds to the 
definitional elements of the crime and which is unlawful, is not sufficient to render 
him criminally liable.  Intention is included in the concept of culpability, being 
one of the forms of culpability.26  The second being negligence.  In Latin these 
legal forms of culpability are referred to as dolus and culpa respectively. 
 
There is however, some debate about whether negligence is a form of fault or an 
assessment of conduct, but it seems that failure to measure up to rational standards 
and reasonableness can be seen as a type of fault.27 
 
According to Snyman28intention, as this term is used in criminal law, means that 
a person commits an act:— 
i. While his will is directed towards the commission of the act or the causing 
of the result; 
ii. In the knowledge of the existence of the circumstances mentioned in the 
definitional elements of the relevant  crime; and   
iii. In the unlawfulness of the act.  An accused is at fault where he or she 
intentionally commits unlawful conduct knowing it to be unlawful.  
Intention, opposed to negligence is the principal form of fault.29   
 
The basis of intention namely, the distinction between deliberate and accidental 
conduct is explained in an elementary appreciation by Oliver Wendell Holmes30 
when he pointed out that “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over 
and being kicked.”  
 
  
                                                          
26  Snyman (note 15 above) 149. 
27  J. Burchell (note 5 above) 152. 
28  Snyman (note 15 above) 181. 
29  Ibid. 
30  O.W. Holmes The Common Law 3ed. (1991). 
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Jeremy Bentham31 is quoted by Snyman:32  
“… whether a man commits an offence knowingly or wilfully or whether he commits it 
unintentionally or even unwittingly, the immediate mistake is precisely the same.  A man 
who does an injury, knowing that he is doing wrong and intending to do it presents himself 
to one’s mind as a wicked and dangerous fellow; while he who commits the mischievous 
act without such knowledge or such intention seems as one to be feared only by his 
ignorance or carelessness.” 
 
The concept of intention has gradually been extended to cover not just deliberate 
but also foreseen conduct33. 
 
South African criminal law is founded upon promoting individual autonomy, 
which is centralised around and manifest in the dominance of the subjectivity of 
intention.  Individuals are regarded as autonomous persons with a general capacity 
to choose among alternative causes of behaviour, and respect for their autonomy 
means holding them liable only on the basis of their choices34. 
 
2.1. Cognitive and conative elements of intention 
Intention as one form of fault (the other being negligence) and has two principal 
elements namely cognitive and conative.   
 
Snyman35  distinguish between  two elements of intentions namely the cognitive 
(or intellectual) and conative (volitional or voluntative) element. 
 
2.1.1. The cognitive element seen in the context of intention refers to the knowledge that 
the accused had of the act, of the circumstances mentioned in the definitional 
elements and of the unlawfulness.36  The aforesaid assessment of the cognitive 
element as it relates to intention should clearly be distinguished from the cognitive 
function as it relates to the assessment of a person’s capacity to act.  In this sense 
the cognitive function relates to a person’s reason or insight and understanding.  
                                                          
31  J. Bentham Theory of Legislation (1950) 17. 
32  Snyman (note 15 above) 459. 
33 Burchell (note 5 above) 344. 
34  A. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 6th Ed (2009) 155. 
35  Snyman (note 15 above). 
36  Ibid at 182. 
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In the Criminal Procedure Act37 the cognitive function as it relates to capacity is 
described as the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of a person’s act.  
Sometimes it is described as the appreciation of the unlawfulness of the act or the 
ability to differentiate between right and wrong.38  However, for the purpose of 
considering the cognitive component in the context of intention, there has to be 
foresight of a circumstance or result and the cognitive element deals with what a 
person conceives to be the circumstance or result of his act.  There is no intention 
if the circumstances or result is not conceived by the actor. 
 
2.1.2. The conative element consists in directing the will towards a certain act or result, 
for example X decide to accomplish in practice what he has pictured to himself in 
his imagination only.  The decision to act transforms what was only “day-
dreaming” or “wishing” or “hoping” into intention.  The decision to act is a 
reconciliation with the foreseen result or circumstance and the actor is not deterred 
by the prospect of a forbidden result flowing from his action.39   
The aforesaid assessment of the conative element has to, as with the cognitive 
element, be distinguished from the assessment of the conative element as it relates 
to the capacity of a person opposed to its function in assessing it (the conative 
element) for the purpose of proving intention. 
 Hiemstra40 describes the conative element, in the capacity context, as a person’s 
ability to conduct himself in accordance with his insight into right and wrong.  
The conative function when assessing capacity exists in a person’s ability to 
control his behaviour in accordance with his insights – which means that unlike 
an animal, he is able to make a decision, set himself a goal, to pursue it, and to 
resist impulses and/or desires to act contrary to what his insight into right or wrong 
reveal to him. Here the key word is self-control.  According to the Rumpff 
Report41 conative function as it relates to capacity, implies “a disposition” of the 
perpetrator through which his insight into the unlawful nature of a particular act 
can restrain him, and thus set up a counter-motive to, its execution.   
                                                          
37 Criminal Procedure Act (as amended) 51 of 1977 (Section 78(1)). 
38 Hiemstra (note 14 above). 
39  Snyman (note 15 above) 204. 
40  Hiemstra (note 14 above). 
41  Rumpff Report 99,9 20-29, 9.33 (Rumpff Commission of Enquiry into Responsibility of 
Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters) 1967. 
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2.2. Forms of Intention 
Snyman42 distinguishes between three forms of intention namely direct intention 
(dolus directus) indirect intention (dolus indirectus) and dolus eventualis or legal 
intent.  These three forms may be indeterminatus (general). 
 
2.2.1. Dolus directus  
With dolus directus one has to do with intention in its ordinary grammatical sense 
namely the accused meant to perpetrate the prohibited conduct or bring about the 
criminal consequence even though the chance of the consequence resulting from 
his conduct was small.  This concept differs from that of a planned and 
premeditated conduct.  In Raath,43Bozalek J indicated that planning and 
premeditation suggests a deliberate weighing up of the proposed criminal conduct 
as opposed to the commission of the crime on the speed of the moment or in 
unexpected circumstances.  According to Bozalek J all the circumstances, 
including the accused’s state of mind and the time between the accused forming 
the intention and carrying out his intention, must be weighed in the balance in 
determining whether the commission of the crime is planned and premeditated.  
On the facts in Raath44 it was held that the period of time between forming intent 
and carrying it out was a matter of a few minutes.  Dolus directus does not 
necessarily require planning and premeditation.  Deliberate, goal directed conduct 
does not necessarily have to be planned over a period of time.45 
 
Direct intention (dolus directus) comprises a person directing his will towards 
achieving the prohibited result or performing a prohibited act.  The result of the 
act is his goal and desire. 
 
The sudden flash of a knife is not easy to clarify in terms of the intention of the 
wielder.  The question to be asked is:  Did the perpetrator actually intend to cause 
the death of the deceased i.e. direct intent (dolus directus) or was it a case of 
foresight of the possibility of resultant death and persistence regardless whether 
                                                          
42  Snyman (note 15 above) 183. 
43  S v Raath 2009(2) SACR 46 (C). 
44  Ibid. 
45  J Burchell Principle of Criminal Law 4th (2013) 746. 
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death ensues or not (murder with dolus eventualis).46  With regard to the 
requirements of “foresight” and “persistence” it becomes clear that the dividing 
line between cases of dolus eventualis and culpable homicide where the 
negligence is required as the form of fault instead of intention, is sometimes rather 
thin.  According to Holmes J47 seeking the right answer in every case one has to 
think one’s way perceptively through the facts, with an approach much more 
robust than exquisite. 
 
Jansen AR48 referring to Mienies49 states that:  “Dolus eventualis is ‘n elastiese 
begrip, aan die een uiterste kan dit grens aan nalatigheid, veral culpa, en aan die 
ander kant aan dolus directus.”  In considering dolus directus there is no degree 
of foresight being applied (graad van voorsienbaarheid) i.e. not the ex post facto 
consideration of the degree of foresight, but rather the subjective consideration of 
the perpetrator at the time that the act was performed. 
 
2.2.2. Dolus Indirectus 
This form of intention exists where, although the unlawful conduct or 
consequence was not the accused’s aim and object, he or she foresaw the unlawful 
conduct or consequence as certain or as substantially certain or virtually certain50 
or as described by Hiemstra.51  “Dolus indirectus exists when the prohibited result 
(with murder, the death of the deceased) is not the main purpose but the 
perpetrator knows that the prohibited result must necessarily follow if the main 
purpose is sought.”  The perpetrator sets a house alight in order to burn to death 
the woman who is inside.  If the perpetrator knew that there are children with her, 
it does not help him to allege that he had no intent to harm the children or as in 
Abraham,52 the accused testified that he did not intend to kill the deceased but 
merely wished to render her unconscious or as he put it “ek wil haar net flou 
‘gechoke’ het”.  Friedman AJA53 further stated that an accused can be found guilty 
                                                          
46  S v Sabben 1975(2) All SA 657(A) 658. 
47  Ibid 658. 
48  S v Dladhla en andere 1980(3) All SA 273 (A). 
49  S v Mienies 1978(4) SA 560 (A) 562. 
50 Burchell (note 45 above) 346. 
51  Hiemstra (note 14 above). 
52  S v Abraham 1990(2) All SA 401 (A). 
53  Ibid 406. 
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of murder whether his mens rea takes a direct or indirect form.  When convicting 
an accused it is not necessary to indicate whether it finds a direct or an indirect 
intention.  The distinction may only be important at the stage when enquiry is 
made into extenuating circumstances. 
 
2.2.3. Dolus eventualis  
The third form of intention apart from direct intention (dolus directus) and indirect 
intention (dolus indirectus) is dolus eventualis or legal intent.  There is no doubt 
that dolus eventualis  is by far the most important form of intention in practice in 
South African criminal law54 or as stated by Loubser and Rabie55 in referring to 
the Beukes56 case:  
“the Appellate Division had yet another occasion to examine the extensive concept of 
dolus eventualis”  
 
and further on: 
“although the concept of dolus eventualis  has been the subject of innumerable reported 
judgments over several decades and almost as many academic publications, there is yet 
no certainty as to its content.” 
 
Paizes stated that “Judicial pronouncement on this subject have been 
characterised by vacillation and a surprising lack of clarity.”57   
 
Whiting,58 described dolus eventualis as “very much a controversial subject.” 
 
Snyman59 defines dolus eventualis as follows: A person acts with intention in the 
form of dolus eventualis if the commission of the unlawful act or the causing of 
the unlawful result is not the main aim but: 
(a) he subjectively foresees the possibility that in striving towards his main 
aim, the unlawful act may be committed or the unlawful result may be 
caused; and 
                                                          
54  SV Hoctor The degree of foresight in Dolus Eventualis SACJ (2013) 131. 
55  MM Loubser & MA Rabie Defining Dolus Eventualis – a voluntative element SACJ (1988) 415. 
56  S v Beukes 1988(1) SA 511 (A). 
57  A. Paizes Dolus Eventualis Reconsidered SALJ (1988) 636. 
58  R Whiting Thoughts on dolus eventualis SACJ (1988) 440. 
59 Snyman (see note 15 above).  
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(b) he reconciles himself to this possibility. 
 
Dolus eventualis is often referred to as legal intention and it occurs where the 
perpetrator foresees the possibility of death occurring and proceeds with his or her 
conduct, reconciling him/herself with the death.60 
 
2.3. The development of dolus eventualis 
It is instructive to examine, in a little more detail the developmental path of the 
notion of dolus eventualis in order to grasp and work with the definition for dolus 
eventualis. 61  
 
In one of the leading cases S v Malinga62 dolus eventualis was described in the 
context of murder: 
“In considering the crime of intention to kill, the test is whether the accused person had 
foreseen the possibility that the act in question would have fatal consequences and was 
reckless whether the harm will result.” 
 
In order to dissect and examine the aforesaid definition or variants thereof such as 
,  
 “the test for such dolus is whether the appellant, subjectively foresaw the possibility 
of death resulting from his assault on the deceased, but persisted therein reckless 
whether such possibility became fact”63 ; or  
 “whether the accused foresaw the possibility of death resulting from the unlawful 
act, yet persisted in his conduct reckless whether death ensued or not.”64   
 
the historical development of the principles of dolus eventualis has to be 
examined. 
 
                                                          
60  JM Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume 1 General Principles of 
Criminal Law 4 Ed. (2011) 363. 
61  Hoctor (note 1 above). 
62 S v Malinga 1963(1) SA 692 (A) 694 G – H. 
63  S v Mtshiza 1970(3) SA 747 (A) 752. 
64  S v Mavhungu 1981(1) SA 56 (A) 66 G – H. 
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Snyman65 stated that there is always a tension between law forces, namely firstly 
abstract theory, adherence to legal dogma or systematic reasoning and secondly 
the concrete or practical demands of social reality, pragmatism or policy 
considerations.   This tension is largely also a tension between subjectivism and 
objectivism, where the subjective approach to criminal liability places emphasis 
on the subjective considerations pertaining to the individual offender and the 
objective approach emphasises the expectations of society. 
 
Although the now established test for intention is invariably subjective in nature, 
thus requiring the court to find, in relation to dolus eventualis, actual subjective 
foresight of the possibility of harm, coming about it was not always so.66   
 
Before 1945 South African law relied upon a presumption that persons intended 
the natural and probable consequence of their acts.67  The presumption neglects 
the accused actual state of mind and is concerned solely with the question as to 
whether a reasonable person in the position of the accused would have foreseen 
the consequences – in other words whether the accused “should” or “ought” to 
have foreseen the consequence irrespective of whether in fact he or she did or 
not.68 
 
Snyman69 confirm the above, stating that up to around 1950, subjective 
considerations pertaining to criminal liability played a sub-ordinate role in the 
construction of criminal liability in South Africa and this introduction into South 
African law of an emphasis on subjective consideration in the construction of 
criminal liability owes much to the work by De Wet & Swanepoel titled Strafreg, 
first published in 1949.70  Apart from consulting the writings on Roman and 
Roman-Dutch Law, De Wet was also strongly influenced by Continental 
European  Literature, in particular German authors such as Von Liszt-Schmidt, 
                                                          
65  C.R. Snyman General Principles of Criminal Liability and Specific Offences – The Tension 
between legal theory and policy considerations in the general principles of criminal law – Acta 
Juridica 1 (2003). 
66  Hoctor (note 61 above) 19.  
67  Whiting (note 58 above) 450. 
68  Ibid. 
69 Snyman (note 65 above). 
70  JC de Wet and HL Swanepoel Strafreg (1949). 
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Von Hippel and Beling, as well as Dutch authors such as Von Hamel, Pompe and 
Vos.71  These authors made a clear distinction between the objective and 
subjective requirement for liability. 
 





the subjective requirements were all placed under the umbrella approach of 
culpability (schuld) or “skuld”. 
The resultant subjective concept of culpability is known as the psychological 
theory of culpability. 
 
Hoctor72 refers to Gie73 who (citing the German author Mezger) includes dolus 
eventualis in the theory on intention in the following formulation “dus word ‘n 
gevolg ook as gewille herlui as die dader op die oomblik van sy handeling die 
moontlikheid voorsien het dat die verbode gevolg deur sy handeling veroorsaak 
kon word.”  It is notable and also pointed out by Hoctor74 that “it is instructive to 
note that the definition makes no reference whatsoever to the volitional 
component in the form of recklessness.” 
 
During the first half of the twentieth century however, the Appellate Division 
preferred the objective test for intention.75 
In R v Jolly76 it was stated that it is a well settled rule that an accused person must 
be taken to have intended the ordinary and natural consequence of his act, 
consequence which he could have foreseen.  It is further stated that the intention 
of an accused person has to be ascertained from his acts and conduct and where a 
person perform a dangerous act, such as derailing a train, it is an inference that 
                                                          
71  De Wet & Swanepoel (note 70 above) 15 – 16. 
72  Hoctor (note 61 above) 19. 
73  CJC Gie n Kritiek op die Grondslae van die Strafreg in Suid-Afrika (1949) 99. 
74  Hoctor (note 61) 19. 
75  Burchell (note 60) 141. 
76  R v Jolly 1923 AD 176. 
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can be drawn from his act, that it was not merely his intention to derail a train, but 
to injure and kill.  The court found that: 
“As there was therefore evidence from which the inference could legally be drawn that 
the accused has an intention to kill, it become entirely a question of fact for the Trial 
Court.” 
 
In R v Jongani77  it was held “that in as much as the appellant must have known78 
that the possible and probable consequence of a stab wound made by a knife 
might, under the circumstances mean the death of a person.” 
 
In R v Duma79 reference is made to Moorman80 who expresses the opinion that a 
proper distinction should be made according to the kind of weapon used by the 
accused.  If a less lethal weapon is used like the accused’s hands as opposed to a 
more deadly weapon such as a gun or pistol one will not usually infer a deadly 
intention.  It is also noted that the words “could” and “ought to have” realised is 
also used.  Tindall JA finds in Jolly81 that the appellant “ought to have 
contemplated” that the deceased would have been killed. 
 
What is clear from the above in particular in the use of terms such as “must be 
taken to have intended”82,  “must have known” and “could and ought to have 
realised”83 is that the objective test ignores the actual state of mind of a perpetrator 
or as stated by Hoctor84 that the crucial question being enquired into is not whether 
the accused actually foresaw the result or consequence of the act, as would be the 
case with an subjective test, but whether the accused ought to have foreseen the 
result or consequence. 
 
                                                          
77  R v Jongani 1937 AD 400. 
78  My emphasis. 
79  R v Duma 1945 AD 410 at 417. 
80  J Moorman Verhandelinge over de misdaden en der selver straffen voor een groot gedeelte 
opgesteldt (2.1.18) JJ van Hasselt. 
81  R v Jolly (note 76 above). 
82  R v Jongani (note 77 above). 
83  R v Duma (note 79 above). 
84  Supra 59 Hoctor (note 61) 19. 
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The reason for the adoption of the objective test as the test for intention was the 
application of the presumption in English law that a person intended the natural 
and probable consequence of his or her action or as stated by Phelps85  
“if a perpetrator should have foreseen a potential consequence resulting from his/her 
actions then the court treats such expected foresight as if the perpetrator had foreseen 
the consequence.” 
 
The principal objection to the presumption referred to above is that it resulted in 
an objective test for intention, which caused an overlap between intention and 
negligence.86 
 
The application of the presumption prevented an earlier development of the 
concept of dolus eventualis in our criminal law.  Holmes JA, as referred to by 
Hoctor,87 stated in De Bruyn88 that the South Africa Courts for many years drew 
scant distinction, if any, between dolus eventualis and dolus directus in murder 
cases, simply applying the presumption in deciding the issue of intention to kill. 
 
The landmark case in the shift to a subjective approach to the assessment of mens 
rea was the ruling by the Appellate Division in Ndhlovu89 placing the onus of 
proof in criminal cases to the state in respect of all elements of liability.  This was 
only the beginning of the development towards the subjective test for intention.  
According to De Wet and Swanepoel90 the test was vicariously and sometimes 
imperfectly formulated.  The development and adoption of the concept of dolus 
eventualis came hand in hand with the adoption of the psychological theory of 
fault, signalled by the rejection of the presumption of intent.91 
 
                                                          
85  K Phelps The role of Error in Objecto in South African Criminal Law : “An opportunity for re-
evaluation presented in S v Pistorius. www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za 
86  Burchell, Milton & Burchell. South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. 1, General 
principles (1983) 189. 
87  Hoctor (note 61 above). 
88  S v De Bruyn 1968(4) SA 498A 509 F – G. 
89  R v Ndhlovu (note 17 above) 389. 
90  JC De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg (1960) 126 – 128. 
91  Hoctor (note 61 above).  
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In R v Nsele92 the Appellate Division cleared up any remaining confusion between 
the objective and subjective enquiries into intention, by confirming the validity of 
dolus eventualis and the adoption of a purely subjective test for intention that has 
been applied by South Africa Courts subsequently.93  Hoctor94 as referred to by 
Phelps stated that: 
“the fictitious reasonable person applied in the negligence test is not applicable to dolus 
eventualis – whatever such reasonable person might notionally have foreseen is 
irrelevant and the only assessment that is relevant is whether the accused actually 
foresaw the harm in question.  A perpetrator can therefore only be held liable in terms of 
dolus eventualis in consequences of his actions that were actually foreseen than those 
that were foreseeable.” 
 
The fact that objectively the accused ought reasonably to have foreseen such 
possibility is not sufficient.  The distinction must be observed between what 
actually went on in the mind of the accused and what would have gone on in the 
mind of a bonus pater familias in the position of the accused.  In other words the 
distinction between subjective foresight and objective foreseeability must not 
become blurred.95. 
 
The central position of dolus eventualis in South Africa criminal law has been 
recognised by the Constitutional Court.96  In S v Coetzee,97 O’Reagen J stated that 
dolus eventualis has been recognized as sufficient to meet the requirement of 
culpability and in Thebus,98 a case dealing with legal limits of common purpose 
liability by active association, it was stated that: 
“he must have intended them to be killed, or he must have foreseen the possibility of their 
being killed and performed his own act of association with recklessness as to whether or 
not death was to ensue”, 
 
thus approving the definitions of dolus eventualis. 
                                                          
92  R v Nsele. 1955(2) SA 145(A). 
93  Phelps (note 85 above). 
94  S Hoctor Death on the roads and dolus eventualis – S v Humphreys 2013(2) SACR 1 (SCA) 
1SACJ (2013) 79. 
95  S v Sigwahla (note 19 above) 570 B – C. 
96  Phelps (note 85 above). 
97  S v Coetzee 1997(3) SA 537 (CC) 177. 




Individual autonomy is central to mens rea and only when people are adequately 
aware of what they are doing and the potential consequences of those actions, can 
they fairly be described as having chosen the behaviour and consequence, thus 
justifying the imposition of the coercive power of the state through criminal 
liability.99 
 
2.4. The tests for dolus eventualis  
Dolus eventualis, as stated above, is defined as follows “a person acts with 
intention in the form of dolus eventualis if the commission of the unlawful act or 
the causing of the unlawful result is not his main aim but: 
(a) He subjectively foresees the possibility that, in striving towards his main 
aim, the unlawful act may be committed or the unlawful result may he 
caused; and 
(b) He reconciles himself to this possibility.”100 
 
The test for dolus eventualis is twofold, in other words it consists of two elements, 
namely (as was referred to in Humphreys101): 
(a). “did the appellant subjectively foresee the possibility of the death of his 
passengers ensuing from his conduct”; and 
(b). “did he reconcile himself with that possibility”. 
 
The foresight is described as the cognitive component of the test and the 
reconciliation as the conative or volitional component of the test. 
 
2.4.1. The cognitive element in the test for dolus eventualis, namely the subjective 
foresight of the prohibited consequence, including the considering of the degree 
of foresight and inferential reasoning  
The cognitive component of the test for dolus eventualis refers to the mental 
foresight of a person or in other words what a person conceives to be the 
circumstances or result of his act.  If there is no foresight of particular 
                                                          
99 A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed. (2006) 158. 
100  Snyman (note 15 above) 184. 
101  Humphreys v S 2013(2) SACR 1 (SAC) SACJ (2013) 79.  
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circumstances or a particular result, then the cognitive component of the test is 
absent and there can be no dolus eventualis. 
 
The South Africa criminal law embraces the psychological concept of culpability 
which demands an enquiry into the subjective state of mind of an accused to 
determine a subjective foresight of the possibility of harm or result. 
 
The question whether the cognitive component of dolus eventualis can be 
established involves a subjective enquiry assessing whether the accused had actual 
foresight of the possibility of the harm occurring102 in this regard. 
 
The subjective or actual foresight of the accused is seldom able to be proved by 
means of direct evidence.  To determine the mental state of mind of the accused a 
court can rely on proof by means of inferential reasoning whereby the presence of 
such foresight can he proved by inference drawn from the accused’s conduct and 
from the circumstances in which the crime was committed.103 
 
In S v Van Aardt104 the appellant was convicted in the Grahamstown High Court 
of murder of a fifteen year old following a beating by the appellant.  The appeal 
to the High Court was unsuccessful, and the matter came on further appeal before 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. The appellant admitted common assault but denied 
that such assault caused the death of the deceased, or that he bore a legal duty to 
seek medical intervention for the deceased.  The court concluded that the appellant 
did cause the death of deceased and then had to assess if the appellant’s actions 
were intentionally.  The court applied the test for dolus eventualis as formulated 
in Sigwahla105 namely a foresight of the possibility of harm.  The subjective 
foresight is established by a process of inferential reasoning.  In S v Van Wyk106 
the dictum demands, that in order to determine subjective foresight by an accused, 
that all the relevant facts which bear on the accused’s state of mind and intention 
must be cumulatively assessed and a conclusion reached as to whether an 
                                                          
102  S v Sigwahla (note 19 above). 
103  S.V. Hoctor The degree of foresight in dolus eventualis SACJ (2013) 135. 
104  S v Van Aardt 2009(2) All SA 184 (SCA). 
105  S v Sigwahla (note 19 above). 
106  S v Van Wyk 1992(1) SACR 147 (Nm). 
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inference beyond reasonable doubt can be drawn from these facts that the accused 
actually considered it a reasonable possibility that the deceased could die, but 
reckless as to such fatal possibility persisted with his conduct or act. 
 
In considering the first component of the test for dolus eventualis namely the 
subjective foresight, it becomes clear that the subjective element of the foresight, 
is determined by inferential reasoning.  Therefore further considering needs to be 
given to the process of inferential reasoning in the process of establishing 
subjective foresight. 
 
2.4.1.1. Inferential reasoning in the process of establishing subjective foresight  
Burchell107 confirms the aforesaid by stating “the subjective test may be satisfied 
by inferential reasoning.”  In S v Mini108 it is stated that in attempting to decide 
by inferential reasoning the state of mind of a particular accused at a particular 
time, it seems that the trier of fact should try mentally to project himself into the 
position of that accused at that time and must be on his guard against the 
“insidious, subconscious influence of ex post facto knowledge”.109 
 
Watermeyer JA sets out, in S v Blom, the fundamental tests that inferential 
reasoning must survive in order to sustain a criminal conviction in South Africa:-
110 
(a) The inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved 
facts, if not then the inference cannot be drawn; and  
(b) The proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable 
inference from them, save the one to be drawn.  If they do not exclude 
other reasonable inferences then there must be doubt whether the inference 
sought to be drawn is correct. 
 
                                                          
107  Burchell (note 60 above) 353. 
108  S v Mini 1963(3) SA 188 (A) 196. 
109  Ibid 196. 
110  R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202 – 3. 
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Wigmore111 as quoted by Cameron112 states that the process of addressing 
evidence and passing of probative value is and must be based ultimately upon the 
cannons of ordinary reasoning, whether explicitly or implicitly employed. 
 
Hoffman and Zeffert113 warn as follows: 
“the possibility of error in direct evidence lies in the fact that the witness may be mistaken 
or lying.  All circumstantial evidence depends ultimately upon facts which are proved by 
direct evidence, but it involves an additional source of potential error because the court 
may be mistaken in its reasoning.  The inference which it draws may be a non-sequitor, 
or it may overlook the possibility of other inferences which are equally probable or at 
least possible”.   
 
and continue: 
“it sometimes happens that the trier of fact is so pleased at having thought of a theory to 
explain the fact that he may tend to overlook, inconsistent circumstances or assume the 
existence of facts which have not been proved and cannot be legitimately inferred”. 
 
Cameron114 further discusses the process of inferential reasoning against the 
background of the Safatsa case 115 stating that there are at least three flaws in the 
court’s reasoning in finding the accused guilty based on inference made from 
circumstantial evidence due to a lack of direct evidence.  Each of these so-called 
flaws will be discussed in order to point out the thought process and 
considerations to be given to proven facts and circumstances to be given when an 
inference is sought. 
 
The discussion revolves around the third accused in the case known as the 
Sharpeville Six.  He was sentenced to death for his participation in the brutal 
murder of the deputy mayor of the Lekoa Local Council.  There was no direct 
evidence to implicate accused number three in the murder.  His conviction was 
based on circumstantial evidence which the court regarded as damning namely:- 
                                                          
111  Wigmore on Evidence (Tillers revision) 1983 Vol. 1A para 30. 
112  E. Cameron Inferential reasoning and extenuation in the case of the Sharpeville Six (1988) SACJ 
243. 
113 LH Hoffman & DT Zeffert The South African Law of Evidence 3 ed. 1983 464. 
114 Cameron (note 112 above). 
115  S v Safatsa 1988(1) SA 868(A). 
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1. A firearm used in the attack was find in possession of the accused.  The 
court find that the only inference that can be drawn is that the accused was 
one of the persons who seized the deceased and disarmed him in order for 
rioters present to pelt him with stones with the intention to kill him. 
2. A co-accused pointed accused three out as someone presumably in 
possession of the firearm that belonged to the deceased. 
3. The court viewed accused three as a lying witness.  “He (accused three) 
could give no acceptable explanation how accused one knew that he had 
possession of the firearm and the only reasonable inference is that he and 
number one accused took the firearm from the deceased.116 
 
The Appellate Division confirmed the death sentence of accused three on appeal. 
 
Cameron117 refers to the “cardinal rule” as found in Blom118 namely that facts 
proved in relation to accused three had to be such that they excluded every 
reasonable inference from them save that he obtained the weapon by participating 
in the murderous attack.  The flaws in the court reasoning, which led to the 
conviction is pointed out: 
1. Failure to consider the accused’s attitude towards the police.  The court 
relied solely on the accused dealings with the policeman upon his arrival 
at the accused’s home.  The Appeal Court119 sought to attach signal and 
sinister importance to what accused three said to the policeman thereby 
failing to take into account the accused’s demeanour and actions upon the 
arrival of the police.  The accused on the arrival of the police and accused 
one at his home (1) admitted that he was in possession of the firearm (2) 
lied about how he come to have it. 
Alternative inference could be made from points (1) and (2) above namely, 
the accused admitted possession as he received the firearm from 
accused one who had now accompanied the police and in respect of (2) 
that he lied about how he came into possession of the firearm as to reveal 
                                                          
116  Ibid. 
117  Cameron (note 112 above). 
118  R v Blom (note 110 above). 
119  S v Safatsa (note 115 above) 892 A – B. 
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that the weapon had been entrusted to him would have incriminated 
accused one immediately. 
2. Neither the trial case nor the appellate division considered the long lapse 
of time between the murder and the weapon’s location at the home of 
accused three.  The fact that accused one took the police to the home of 
accused three proves nothing more than that accused one knew that 
accused three had the firearm.  The only basis the court has for inferring 
the guilt of accused three was that he had lied about how he came to be in 
possession of the firearm.  This untruthfulness does not seem sufficient in 
the circumstances to convict accused three. 
3. Accused three was considered an untruthful witness, which led to an 
inference of guilt against accused three.   
 
Cameron120 states that there are two well-known strands of thinking about a lying 
accused in the Appellate Division precedents. 
(1)  The first is represented in R v Mlambo121 where Malan JA states  
“In my opinion there is no obligation upon the crown to close every avenue of 
escape which may be said to be open to an accused.  An accused’s claim to the 
benefit of a doubt when it may be said to exist must not be derived from 
speculation but must rest upon a reasonable and solid foundation created either 
by positive evidence or gathered from reasonable inference which are not in 
conflict with or outweighed by the proved facts of the case.  Moreover, if an 
accused deliberately takes the risk of giving false evidence in the hope of being 
convicted of a less serious crime or even, perchance escaping conviction 
altogether and his evidence is declared to be false and irreconcilable with the 
proved facts a court will in suitable cases be fully justified in rejecting an 
argument that, notwithstanding, that the accused did not avail himself of the 
opportunity to mitigate the gravity of the offence, he should nevertheless receive 
the same benefit as if he had done so.” 
(2) In Steynberg122 the Appellate Division underlined that the Mlambo 
approach must be applied in suitable cases only and emphasized that lying 
by an accused can never itself be the basis for a conviction.  The court 
                                                          
120  Cameron (note 112 above). 
121 R v Mlambo 1957(4) SA 727 (A) 738 A – D. 
122  S v Steynberg 1983(3) SA 140 (A) 146. 
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stated that where the question concerns intent to kill the assessment must 
occur in accordance with the principles formulated in Blom.123 
 
The Appellate Division confirm the caution expressed in Steynberg124 about 
drawing inferences or penalising an accused for his untruthfulness.  Special care 
should be taken not to infer that because an accused was a liar that he is probably 
guilty.  What have to be considered are the nature, extent and materiality of the 
lies, the accused’s own circumstances which might explain the lies.125 
 
On returning to the point under discussion namely the first component of dolus 
eventualis , which is seldom proved by direct evidence, as it is a subjective test 
and therefore more often proved by inference.  In Humphreys126 it was confirmed 
that “subjective foresight can be proved by inference.”  Common sense dictating 
that the process of inferential reasoning may start out from the premise that , in 
accordance with common human experience, the possibility of the consequence 
that ensued would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence.  The 
next logical step would then be to ask whether in light of all the facts and 
circumstances of this case, there is any reason to think that the accused will not 
have shared the foresight, derived from common human experience, with other 
members of the general population. 
 
2.4.1.2 The degree of foresight required to establish dolus eventualis  
In his article, The concept of dolus eventualis in South African Law – A Historical 
Perspective,127 Professor Hoctor states that there are a number of matters 
regarding the content of dolus eventualis which are still disputed and that two of 
the more significant disputes relates to the following questions: 
(1) Should the cognitive component be limited to a foresight if a real or 
reasonable possibility of harm or does foresight of a remote possibility 
suffice. 
                                                          
123  R v Blom (note 110 above). 
124  S v Steynberg (note 122 above). 
125  S v Mtsweni 1985(1) SA 590 (A) 593 – 4. 
126  Humphreys v S (note 101 above) 79. 
127  Hoctor (note 1 above) 22. 
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(2) Can the conative component which require recklessness on the part of the 
actor, he adequately delineated, and if not should there be a conative 
component in the test for dolus eventualis. 
 
The latter question shall be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter, however, 
before proceeding to that discussion, the degree of foresight that is required has 
to be discussed thoroughly as the conative component namely, recklessness is not 
even discussed in cases where the accused was acquitted on the ground that there 
was no intention where the element of foresight, the first element of dolus 
eventualis, was found to be lacking.128 
 
Turning once again to what Holmes JA set out in S v Sigwahla129 namely that 
intention to kill does not in law necessarily require  that the accused should have 
applied his will to compassing the death of the deceased, but that it is sufficient 
if:— 
(1) the accused subjectively foresaw the possibility of his act causing death; 
and 
(2)  was reckless of such result, 
 
It is clear that the statement by Smith130 is confirmed namely that the conative 
element or so called second elements of the test for dolus eventualis is only 
considered once foresight of the result has been established. 
 
In R v Thibani131 Schreiner JA stated that a man only have the intention to kill 
even though he does not visualize death as more likely than not to result from his 
act and132 further stating: 
“I do not think that it would matter whether he thought that death would very probably 
result or whether he thought that, though reasonably possible, it would probably not 
result.  The possibility of death resulting even as a remote chance would suffice.”133 
 
                                                          
128  PT Smith Recklessness in Dolus Eventualis  SALJ (1979) 81. 
129 S v Sigwahla (note 19 above) 570. 
130  Smith (note 128 above). 
131  R v Thibani 1949(4) SA 720 AD 729 – 30. 
132 My emphasis. 
133  Paizes (note 2 above) 637. 
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Hoctor134 states that in earlier dicta where it was stated that the requisite foresight 
was foresight of the probability of harm. This was confirmed in R v Longane135 
and R v Bergstedt.136  In R v Buthelezi137 the term “calculated” was used to express 
that the requisite mental state was greater than foresight of a possibility or 
foresight that the act in question was “likely” to cause the particular result.  As 
originally raised in R v Valachia138 it is now accepted and firmly established that 
the accused need only foresee the “possibility” of harm occurring.139 
 
In R v Horn140 it was settled that the cognitive component of dolus eventualis 
comprises foresight of the possibility of harm and that was the requirement set in 
the majority of cases as quoted by Hoctor.141  
 
In S v Mini142 the Appellate Division held that the foresight of a possibility even 
slight or remote in nature constitutes the cognitive component of dolus eventualis. 
 
Hoctor143 states that notwithstanding the Appellate Division accepting an 
unqualified foresight of possibility, case law seemed to favour foresight of a 
qualified possibility of harm.  In other words a foresight of a real, substantial or 
reasonable possibility. 
 
In S v De Bruyn144 the first appellant wanted to “teach the deceased a lesson”.  
When the deceased was struck to the ground by both the first and second appellant 
the appellant kicked the deceased’s head with a shod foot.  Holmes JA stated145 
that what is needed in these cases is down-to-earth reasoning with a view to 
ascertain what was going on in the mind of the appellants.  This reasoning involves 
looking at all the facts on the ground as it were, and allowing for human factors 
                                                          
134  Hoctor (note 54 above) 133. 
135 R v Longane 1938 AD 532 at 539. 
136  R v Bergstedt 1955(4) SA 186 (A). 
137  R v Buthelezi 1925 AD 160 at 161.   
138  R v Valachia 1945 AD 826 at 830. 
139  Hoctor (note 54 above) 132. 
140  R v Horn 1958(3) SA (A) 457 at 457A – 467B. 
141  Hoctor (note 54 above) 132 (vn 35). 
142  S v Mini 1963(3) SA 188 (A) 191 H. 
143  Hoctor (note 54 above) 136. 
144 S v De Bruyn (note 88 above) 498. 
145 Ibid 507. 
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such as the robust truism that, when the blood is up, reason is apt to recede, or the 
human frailty that when intoxicating liquor has been imbibed to freely, sensitivity 
is apt to become blunted, so that a man may do things which sober he would not 
do.  One must eschew any tendency to legalistic armchair reasoning.  In analysing 
the different characteristics of dolus eventualis, Holmes JA stated further that: 
“subjective foresight of the possibility however remote of the unlawful conduct causing 
death to another is sufficient to satisfy the element of foreseeability that is required for 
dolus eventualis.146 
 
Despite the acceptance of foresight of an unqualified possibility, the opposite 
viewpoint namely a foresight of a qualified possibility namely a “real,” 
“substantial” or “reasonable” foresight were developed in the writings of certain 
jurists.147  Hoctor148 discusses the three principal arguments against the 
acceptance of a remote of slight possibility of harm. 
 
The first is with reference to Burchell and Hunt149 as quoted:- 
“[S]urely he cannot be said to intend a consequence, even in the legal sense of intention 
… if he foresees it only as a very remote risk, or as a hundred to one chance or … on the 
footing that anything is possible….” 
 
Burchell150 distinguished between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence by 
considering the degree of foresight, stating that anything short of a foresight of 
reasonable possibility of harm constitute conscious negligence and not intention 
(dolus eventualis). 
 
The second is an argument that foresight of a remote possibility is far too wide 
and could lead to anomalous and unjust results.151  Morkel152 as quoted by Hoctor, 
favours a foresight of a concrete possibility and argue that if a remote possibility 
constituted sufficient foresight for liability, it could mean that a person could be 
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held liable for a crime requiring intention where such persons conduct did not 
even fall short of that of the reasonable person.153 
 
The third argument is that a foresight of a remote possibility has no use or 
application in practice.  Paizes154 states that although our courts confirmed that 
foresight of a remote possibility is sufficient to establish dolus eventualis, the form 
of intention has never been found to be present where the accused has foreseen 
the possibility of the consequence of the conduct as slight on remote, but only 
where the possibility is real. 
 
Burchell and Hunt155 is of opinion that the degree of foresight required is foresight 
of a real, if not substantial possibility. 
 
Hoctor156 states that Paizes157 and Whiting158 both favour the requirement of 
foresight of a substantial possibility, however both concede that in certain specific 
cases foresight of a remote possibility will suffice. 
 
There has been a number of cases which dealt with foresight of a reasonable or 
real possibility. 
 
Hoctor159 concluded that there is now unanimity in South Africa law that the 
cognitive component of dolus eventualis should consist of foresight of a 
possibility and that it should be described in unqualified terms and that logic, 
language and the longstanding recognition of the unqualified possibility should 
be accepted, although there have been objections to the use of the unqualified 
criteria.  The decisions in Beukes160 and  Makgatho161 favoured a foresight of a 
reasonable possibility, but this approach presents a particular problem given the 
test for negligence which asks the question whether a reasonable person would 
                                                          
153  Hoctor (note 54 above) 137. 
154  A. Paizes (note 57 above) 642. 
155 Burchell (note 60 above) 146. 
156  Hoctor (note 54 above) 139. 
157  Paizes (note 154 above). 
158  Whiting (note 58 above) 443. 
159  Hoctor (note 54 above) 131. 
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have foreseen the reasonable possibility, thereby not assisting in maintaining the 
distinction between the test for intention (subjective) and negligence (objective).  
Paizes162 is careful in submitting that foresight of a slight or remote possibility 
should not ordinarily suffice for legal intention, but states that there are 
exceptional cases where foresight of a remote (however remote) possibility should 
be viewed as sufficient.  This will depend on the circumstances of each case. 
 
Notwithstanding the arguments in favour of a qualified foresight, the courts tend 
to refer to a foresight of a possibility or risk of death unqualified, in other words 
not defining the degree of foresight.  This viewpoint or approach on an unqualified 
foresight is supported by the statement of Schreiner JA in R v Nsele163 as quoted 
by Hoctor:164  
“provided that the risk must have been and therefore, by inference was present to the 
mind of the accused, and provided that he was reckless whether or not it matured in 
death, I do not think that the seriousness of the risk is material”. 
 
The aforesaid is further supported in S v De Bruyn165 where it is stated that if “an 
accused were to admit that he foresaw the possibility of death, on the footing that 
anything is possible, that would contribute to a conviction of murder”. 
 
Van Oosten166 pointed out that if foresight of a real possibility constitutes 
foresight for the purposes of intention, an accused with less than such foresight 
could only be found guilty on the basis of conscious negligence (luxuria) then 
even if the accused has reconciled himself to the result occurring, there would be 
no dolus eventualis present. 
 
Hoctor167 further argues that none of the qualifying adjectives on either side of the 
debate are helpful and in quoting Du Plessis168 states that it would be very difficult 
if not impossible to distinguish between very remote, fairly remote, real, 
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substantial and concrete possibilities objectively as questions of fact.  Hoctor169 
then states that it would be far more sensible to instead of seeking to identify a 
suitable adjective, for the degree of foresight, that the cognitive component should 
be established in terms of the actual subjective foresight of the possibility of harm 
and although their approach may increase the liability for crimes such as murder 
there are still safeguards to ensure that unfair convictions does not occur. 
 
Loubser and Rabie170 as quoted by Hoctor171 stated: 
“the greater the likelihood or probability of death the stronger would be the inference 
that the accused foresaw it”  
Therefore the probability or likelihood or the result occurring would more 
strongly support the inference that the accused foresaw the result. 
 
It is now a widely accepted fact and established principle172 that intention in the 
form of dolus eventualis requires proof of two components namely the subjective 
foresight which was discussed above and reconciliation by the perpetrator with 
the foreseen result.  The reconciliation with the foreseen result, is according to 
Hoctor173 a further safeguard against conviction that follow an unqualified 
foresight. 
 
2.4.2. The conative element in the test for dolus eventualis namely the reconciliation 
with the foreseen result or taking into the bargain of the foreseen consequence 
or recklessness towards the foreseen consequence  
Dolus eventualis is not proved if the accused foresee a result but he decides or 
comes to the conclusion that the result will not ensue from this act.174 
 
The second component of the test for dolus eventualis requires that after having 
foreseen that the result may follow his actions, the perpetrator must also reconcile 
himself with the possibility that the result may follow. 
 
                                                          
169  Hoctor (note 54 above) 154. 
170 Loubser (note 55 above) 417.  
171  Hoctor (note 54 above) 154. 
172  Snyman (note 15 above) 184. 
173  Hoctor (note 54 above) 154. 
174  Snyman (note 172 above) 186. 
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Reconciliation with the possibility is explained by Snyman175 as going ahead with 
the action even though it was foreseen that the action may result in a prohibited 
result. 
 
Burchell176 states that subjective foresight of the possibility of the occurrence of 
a consequence or the existence of circumstances is not in itself sufficient for dolus 
eventualis.  In addition the accused’s state of mind with regard to that possibility 
must be one of consenting to the materialisation of the possibility, reconciling 
himself or herself to it, taking into the bargain or acting reckless with regard to 
that possibility.  The aforesaid terms were used by Jansen JA in S v Ngubane177 
elaborating on what he had expressed in Dladla178 stating that; 
“the distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis is the volitional component in terms of 
which the actor consents to the consequences foreseen, reconciles himself to it and takes 
it into the bargain.  Further confirming that the recklessness of which our courts often 
speaks means no more than this consenting reconciliation and taking into the 
bargain.”179 
 
In Humphreys180 Brand JA refers to the impact of the second element, namely the 
“reconciliation with” by referring to the explanation given by Jansen JA in 
Ngubane:181  
“a man may foresee the possibility of harm and yet be negligent in respect of that harm 
ensuing e.g. by unreasonably underestimating the degree of possibility or unreasonably 
failing to take steps to avoid that possibility. The concept of conscious (advertent) 
negligence (luxuria) is well known in the continent and has in recent times often been 
discussed by our writers.  Conscious negligence is not to be equated with dolus 
eventualis.  The distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis, is the volitional component: 
the agent (perpetrator) “consents” to the consequence foreseen as a possibility, “he 
reconciles himself” to it, he takes into the bargain … our cases often speaks of the agent 
being reckless of that consequence but in this context it means consenting, reconciling 
and taking into the bargain … and not the “recklessness” of the Anglo American system 
                                                          
175  Ibid. 
176  Burchell (note 60 above) 365. 
177  S v Ngubane 1985(3) SA 677(A). 
178  S v Dladla en ander 1981(1) SA 1 (A) . 
179  Paizes (note 154 above) 637. 
180  S v Humphreys (note 101 above). 
181  S v Ngubane (note 177 above) 685 A – H. 
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nor an aggravated degree of negligence.  It is the particular, subjective, volitional mental 
state in regard to the foreseen possibility which characterises dolus eventualis and which 
is absent in luxuria…”  
 
Paizes182 states that an actor who performs a voluntary act consents, reconciles or 
takes into the bargain nothing more or nothing less than what he foresees at the 
time.  This is a very wide test for dolus eventualis. 
 
In Sethoga183 the consent or taking into the bargain was described by using the 
words “persisted in such conduct” i.e. the foreseen unlawful conduct. 
 
In Beukes184 Van Heerden JA was of the view that as an accused would seldom 
admit the volitional component of the dolus eventualis test and that a court had to 
draw an inference regarding an accused’s state of mind from the facts indicating, 
objectively assessed, a reasonable possibility that the result will ensue from the 
mere fact that he acted, it could be inferred that he reconciled himself to the result. 
 
Burchell185 in reference to what was said by Van Heerden JA in Beukes186 states 
that there are two circumstances in which the volitional component is useful:— 
(i) when the perpetrator realises that a result could well ensue, but then takes 
steps to guard against the result occurring (although he admits that this 
case could be seen as one where the perpetrator eventually does not regard 
the result as a consequence of a reasonable possibility) and 
(ii) when a perpetrator had initially not foreseen the consequence as a 
reasonable possibility, but after the causal chain of events has commenced 
he or she changed his or her opinion. 
In the latter case the perpetrator would be reckless if he or she did not take steps 
to terminate the chain of events. 
 
                                                          
182  Paizes (note 154 above) 637. 
183  S v Sethoga 1990(1) SA 270 (A) 275 – 276. 
184  S v Beukes (note 56 above) 128. 
185  Burchell (note 5 above) 157. 
186  S v Beukes (note 56 above) 182. 
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The volitional or second element of dolus eventualis should clearly be 
distinguished from negligence. 
 
In Humphreys,187 Brand JA stated that the second element of dolus eventualis 
should not be misunderstood as the equivalent of recklessness, in the sense of 
aggravated negligence.  The true enquiry is however to ask if a perpetrator took 
the consequence that he foreseen into the bargain.  If therefore a perpetrator 
thought that the consequence that he subjectively foresee would not actually 
occur, then the second element of dolus eventualis would not have been 
established. 
 
In Maritz188 Van den Heever JA observed that a person does not accept a foreseen 
risk into the bargain when he or she is convinced that he or she can prevent it 
occurring.  Therefore the requirement that there must be a reconciliation with the 
possibility that the result may follow and once there is the acceptance that the 
prohibited result may follow, then the actor proceeds, reckless as to whether the 
prohibited result does follow.  In Nkombani, Holmes JA189 stated that to reck 
means to “take heed of something, so as to be alarmed or troubled thereby or so 
as to modify ones conduct or purpose on that account.” 
 
The requirement of recklessness was introduced into our law in 1945190 by the 
Valachia191 case where the court relied on the Native Territories Penal Code.192 
 
Although there was reference to recklessness in prior cases, most cases only 
required that the perpetrator should have been reckless as to whether or not the 
unlawful consequence ensues.  In R v Ngcobo193, Innes CJ said:   
“An intention to kill is an essential element in murder…..  Such an intent is not confined 
to cases where there is a definite purpose to kill, it is also present in cases where the 
                                                          
187  S v Humphreys (note 110 above) para 18. 
188  S v Maritz 1996(1) SACR 405(A) 416. 
189  S v Nkombani 1963(4) SA 896 (A). 
190  Loubser (note 55 above) 419. 
191  R v Valachia (note 138 above) 826. 
192  Smith (note 128 above) 84. 
193  R v Ngcobo 1921 AD 92. 
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object is to inflict grievous bodily harm calculated to cause death, regardless of whether 
dead results or not.” 
 
Smith194 states that the Valachia195 case had a profound effect in our law on the 
second element of dolus eventualis, namely the volitional component.  The 
question in the case was: What constituted dolus eventualis?  Greenberg JA then 
proceeded to explain the word “reckless” in regard to the volitional component.  
If the offender means to cause the person killed any bodily injury, which is known 
to the offender to be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or 
does not mean to cause death, is reckless whether death ensues or not. 
 
The word recklessness has connotations of negligence.  In the English law 
recklessness involves a culpable failure to take precautions coupled with foresight 
of the consequences.  Smith196 states “to use the term to denote an attitude 
towards the foreseen risk of death is wrong, because in the English law it does not 
involve that idea at all.”  Then concludes that the reference to recklessness in 
dolus eventualis is the result of an historical accident.  In adopting Section 140 of 
the Transkeian Penal Code, the court in Valachia197 introduced into South African 
law a concept that was not only unwarranted but also a misleading expression of 
English law. 
 
The killing of a human being cannot be, both intentional (dolus eventualis) and 
negligent (recklessness viewed objectively) as confirmed in S v Ngubane198  
“(i) the logical impossibility of concluding that a man may at one and the same time 
foresee certain consequences and also fail to foresee those consequences (ii) the premise 
that dolus and culpa are incompatible concepts.” 
 
                                                          
194  Smith (note 128 above) 81. 
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In S v Ntuli199 and S v Burger200 it was confirmed that although the divide between 
dolus eventualis and culpa are small there is no doubt that the two concepts are 
“twee selfstandige en onderskeibare skuld vorms.” 
In the case of dolus the perpetrator is held accountable for the foresight of the 
unlawful consequence and acting reckless towards the foreseen result, while in 
the case of culpa the perpetrator is held accountable for not having the expected 
foresight. 
 
Burchell & Hunt201 states that the recklessness required for dolus eventualis 
means the taking of a conscious risk.  The accused foresees the consequence in 
question as a real possibility and yet persists in his conduct irrespective of whether 
it does result or not.  It seems that in every situation where the accused does 
foresee the consequence as at least a real possibility and nevertheless persist in his 
conduct irrespective of whether it result or not, he does consciously take the risk 
of it happening. 
 
The distinction between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence is not found 
in the volitional element.  In the case of dolus eventualis the perpetrator is blamed 
for having acted despite having foreseen, as a concrete possibility, that his conduct 
may be criminal.202 
 
In view of the fact that dolus and culpa are two conceptually different concepts, 
the question is asked whether proof of dolus necessarily excludes culpa.203  Dolus 
connotes a volitional state of mind and culpa may entail a state of no mind.  Culpa 
is constituted by conduct falling short of a particular standard namely that of the 
reasonable person and although this reasonable person standard may be 
individualised to some extent in certain circumstances, it remains an objective 
standard.  Failing to meet the objective standard is the essence of culpa and it is 
therefore unrealistic to equate it to a subjective state of mind.  In view of the 
above, proof of dolus does not exclude culpa. 
                                                          
199  S v Ntuli 1975(1) SA 429 (A) 436. 
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In S v Du Preez204 it was stated that to shoot with a pistol in the direction of a 
moving human being leaving so small a margin for safety may indeed fairly be 
described as reckless conduct, but reckless conduct per se is not necessarily to be 
equated with dolus eventualis.205 
Smith206 further states that if it follows that recklessness meant negligence there 
would, in the case of dolus eventualis be no room for private defence or the 
defence of necessity.  De Wet and Swanepoel207 as referred to by Smith208 take 
the view that the test for private defence and necessity makes no reference to the 
reasonable man (the test for negligence/culpa) but is only concerned with external 
facts.  The unreasonableness or reckless of an accused’s conduct has nothing to 
do with mens rea and should be considered in connection with a defence against 
unlawfulness.   When an accused raises private defence his argument is that he 
acted as a reasonable man would have.  The court therefore makes a decision on 
the same basis as if deciding on negligence and it follows that if recklessness 
meant negligence there would be, in the case of dolus eventualis, no room for 
private defence of a defence of necessity. 
 
Most cases simply require that the accused should have been reckless as to 
whether or not the consequence ensues209 and as stated above this concept was 
introduced by Valachia.210 
 
In S v Lubbe211 recklessness by the accused is described as the accused being 
“onverskillig teenoor die moontlikheid van dood” or as described in S v Kramer212 
“roekeloos teenoor die moontlikheid van dood.” 
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In R v Chitate,213 R v Lewis214 and R v Ngcobo,215 all referred to by Loubser and 
Rabie,216 recklessness is described as the accused having acted or persisted 
regardless of whether the result occurred or not or with callous or reckless 
disregard of this consequence, or acted “ongeag wat die gevolge van sy aksies is”. 
 
The presence of the element of recklessness is normally proved by inference and 
the seriousness of the risk which an accused took would, according to Loubser 
and Rabie217 also be a factor from which it would be inferred that the accused was 
in a reckless frame of mind, therefore the author concluded that a finding of 
recklessness for the purpose of dolus eventualis pre-imposes subjective foresight 
of the possible consequence and reckless conduct without such foresight is not 
sufficient to establish dolus eventualis. 
 
Some writers are of the opinion that the conative (second) part of the test for dolus 
eventualis is redundant218 and that all that is required for dolus eventualis is 
subjective foresight of the possibility of the result ensuing but provided the 
possibility is not remote but substantial or concrete thus resulting in the second 
leg namely the recklessness or reconciliation with the prohibited result not adding 
anything to the first part of the test. 
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid viewpoint, the courts favour the approach of a two-
legged test for dolus eventualis.  As stated in S v Dladla219 the distinguishing 
feature of dolus eventualis is the volitional component where the accused 
consented to and reconciled himself with or takes the consequence into the 
bargain. 
 
                                                          
213  S v Chitate 1968(2) PH H371(R). 
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In S v Dlodlo220 it was stated that a possible explanation for recklessness so seldom 
featuring in private practice is that this element is usually automatically inferred 
from the proved foresight by the accused. 
 
Burchell & Hunt221 states that recklessness involves the taking of a conscious risk 
on deliberate chance but, as pointed out by Smith,222 this would be a superfluous 
requirement, because the accused who initially foresees the possible occurrence 
of the consequence in question, but does not take a conscious risk “has either not 
acted at all or has acted involuntary, in which case there is no actual risk or has modified 
his conduct so that he no longer believes that there is any risk of harm in which case there 
is no foresight”. 
 
Burchelll & Hunt takes223 the view that recklessness is a colourless concept 
notwithstanding this remark and what has been discussed above, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal has attempted to provide some guidance as to the content of the 
conative component of the test for dolus eventualis. 
 
In S v Humphreys224 the impact of the element was confirmed with reference to 
S v Ngubane,225concluding that the question to be answered is whether it had been 
established that the appellant reconciled himself with the consequence of his 
conduct which he subjectively foresaw.  The reconciliation with the consequence 
appears to be confirmed when the appellant, “appreciating the possibility of the 
consequence nonetheless proceeded with his conduct, reckless as to these 
consequences.” 
 
Notwithstanding the attempt to clarify the conative component it is argued in the 
contrary226 that the judgment ultimately failed to clarify the legal position.227. 
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In S v Beukes228 as quoted by Hoctor229 the court reasoned that where a court 
establishes that the accused foresaw a consequence, invariably the conative 
component is also held to be present.  The question that then arises in regard to 
the conative element is as referred to in Humphreys230  
“whether the appellant took the consequence that he foresaw into the bargain, whether 
it can be inferred that it was immaterial to him whether these consequences would flow 
from his actions or put differently, the principle is that if it can reasonably be inferred 
that the appellant may have thought that the possible consequence he subjectively 
foresaw would not actually occur, then the conative element of dolus eventualis would 
not have been established.” 
 
A court thus draws an inference as to the state of mind from the facts which 
indicate that it was objectively viewed, reasonably possible that the consequence 
in question would ensue.231 
 
In S v Van Aardt,232 Kgomo AJA approved the following dictum from S v Van 
Wyk233 with reference to the inference to be drawn in determining the conative 
component of dolus eventualis.   
“All the relevant facts which bear on the accused’s state of mind and intention must be 
cumulatively assessed and a conclusion reached as to whether an inference beyond 
reasonable doubt can be drawn from these facts that the accused actually considered it 
a reasonable possibility that the deceased could die from the assault but, reckless as to 
such fatal possibility, embarked on or persisted with the assault.” 
 
With regard to the word recklessness Brand JA stated in Humphreys234 that once 
the second element of dolus eventualis is misunderstood as the equivalent of 
recklessness in the sense of aggravated negligence, a finding that this element had 
been established on the facts of the case, seems inevitable. 
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Negligence (culpa) and intention (dolus) cannot overlap or co-exist on the same 
facts.  This relationship was somewhat clouded in the decision of S v Ngubane235 
where the court found that it is incorrect to assume on the same facts that proof of 
intention excludes the possibility that an accused was negligent.  This resulted in 
the much criticised inference that intention and negligence can overlap.  
Snyman236 stating that: 
“from a theoretical point of view the decision in Ngubane is clearly wrong.  The argument 
of the court is contradictory and a study in illogicality.” 
 
  
                                                          
235  S v Ngubane (note 225 above). 




3.  S v PISTORIUS 
3.1. Dolus Eventualis and S v Pistorius : The facts of the case and the High Court 
Judgment and appeal to the SCA considered . 
This decision in S v Pistorius237 has as a result, caused a level of interest that is 
without precedent in the history of our system of criminal justice.238 
 
The undisputed (common cause) facts of this case was set out by Masipa J as 
follows239:— 
 That on 14 February 2013 shortly after 3 in the morning screams were heard 
from the accused’s house. 
 that the accused, while on his stumps, fired four shots at the toilet door. 
 that at the time the shots were fired the deceased was inside the toilet. 
 that the door of the toilet was locked from the inside. 
 that the door of the toilet opened to the outside that is onto the bathroom. 
 that three of the four shots struck the deceased. 
 that the deceased sustained a wound on the right thigh, a wound on the left 
upper arm, a head injury and a wound on the web of the fingers, 
 that the deceased died of multiple gunshot wounds. 
 that soon after the shots had been fired the accused called for help. 
 that the accused used a cricket bat to break down the door. 
 that the accused removed the deceased from the toilet to the hallway 
downstairs. 
 that the accused was very emotional soon after the incident, and 
 that the accused was trying to resuscitate the deceased. 
 
The accused was charged with the murder of Reeva Steenkamp, the deceased.240  
The accused pleaded not guilty stating241 that when he had armed himself with the 
                                                          
237  S v Pistorius CC 113/2013 11/9/2014 (unreported). 
238  S. Van der Merwe Criminal Justice Review 2/2014, A. Paizes A Ed, at 4 The trial of Oscar 
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firearm and fired through the toilet door he was acting in the mistaken belief that 
the deceased who was then, unknown to him in the toilet, was an intruder who 
posed a threat to his life and to that of the deceased.  He believed that the intruder 
or intruders had come in through an open bathroom window which was not 
protected by burglar guards as he had earlier heard the window slide open and was 
unaware that the deceased had left the bedroom to go to the toilet.242 
 
Murder is the intentional killing of another human being and as discussed above243 
intention has three forms and after considering the common cause facts, the 
evidence of all the witnesses and drawing the inference the court found244 that 
there was only one essential point of dispute: namely, did Pistorius have the 
intention to kill the deceased when he pulled the trigger and fired the four shots 
through the closed toilet door. 
 
There are three forms of intention, as discussed above,245 namely dolus directus, 
dolus indirectus and dolus eventualis or legal intent ,which forms the topic of this 
dissertation.246 
 
Dolus eventualis or legal intent consists of two elements namely foresight by the 
accused of the prohibited result and secondly proceeding with his conduct thereby 
being reckless towards the foreseen result or as explained by Snyman247  
“going ahead with the action even though it was foreseen that the action may result in a 
prohibited result.” 
 
Dolus eventualis is established by a subjective test as confined in S v Ndhlovu.248 
The court must determine what the state of mind of the particular person, the 
accused, was when he committed the act.  The question is not what he should have 
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foreseen but what the accused had in actual fact foreseen.  The court has in 
numerous cases249 confirmed the subjective test for intention.250 
 
Proving an accused’s actual subjective state of mind is not an easy task and an 
accused will in the majority of cases not admit to a state of mind that proves dolus 
eventualis i.e. a subjective foresight of the prohibited result and a reconciliation 
with such result. 
 
In S v Dlodlo251 it was also stated that the subjective state of mind of an accused 
is not ordinarily capable of direct proof, therefore the subjective state of mind at 
the time when he acted, is objectively proved by inferential reasoning.  The 
fundamental test for inferential reasoning as discussed above252 namely the 
inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts and the 
proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from 
them, save the one to be drawn. 
 
Considering R v Mlambo253 and S v Nkombani254one may, in drawing the 
inference of dolus eventualis,  consider what the normal or reasonable person in 
the same circumstances would have realised.  In other words conclusions may be 
drawn on the grounds of objective probabilities based on general human 
experience.255  The court should endeavour to mentally place itself in the position 
of the accused at the time of the conduct256 taking into account the subjective 
ignorance or stupidity of the accused and avoiding post facto armchair 
reasoning.257 
 
The focal point of this dissertation is the so-called second element of the test for 
legal intent or dolus eventualis namely the actor’s reconciliation or taking into the 
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bargain of the foreseen prohibited consequence.  Considering what has been said 
above, it is clear that the result of any attempt to give a clear picture on the 
volitional component as an element of dolus eventualis, without due and proper 
consideration and understanding of the undermentioned related elements, 
concepts and principles will remain vague: 
 The element of subjective foresight as the first component in the test to proof 
dolus eventualis.258 
 The various forms of intention.259 
 Distinguishing between dolus and culpa, with a specific and clear 
understanding of what is meant by the word reckless in the context of the 
volitional component.260 
 An understanding of unlawfulness261 and specifically in the context to S v 
Pistorius, a clear understanding of private defence and putative self-defence262 
as well as the principles of error in objecto263. 
 The principles of inferential reasoning264 and the assessment of circumstantial 
evidence265 during the process of drawing an inference from the circumstantial 
evidence266 and proved facts in order to prove the subjective state of mind of 
an accused. 
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Returning to the judgment267 when the count a quo enquired into the evidence 
submitted it is clear that one essential point was in dispute, namely did the accused 
have the intention, either direct or the legal intent (dolus eventualis) to kill the 
deceased. 
 
The court turned to the facts in order to determine whether the state had discharged 
the onus of proving intent to kill, whether in the form of dolus directus or dolus 
in directus.  The court stated268 that no onus vests on the accused to convince the 
court of the truth of any explanation that he gives and if there is any possibility of 
the accused’s explanation being true, then he is entitled to his acquittal269.  In 
respect of dolus directus the court accepted the accused’s version “the simple 
explanation from the accused is that shooting the deceased was a genuine mistake 
as he thought he was shooting at an intruder behind the door”.270 
 
The court continues: 
“Viewed in its totality the states evidence failed to establish that the accused had the 
requisite intention to kill the deceased …. referring to direct intention.”271 
 
The court then considered intent in the form of dolus eventualis which had to be 
proved in accordance with established tests as set out in S v De Bruyn 1968(4) SA 
498 (A)272 or as set out in the established twofold approach namely:— 
(1) did the accused subjectively foresee the possibility of death; 
(2) did he reconcile himself with the possibility273;or 
 
The questions was put as follows by Masipa J in S v Pistorius.274  
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(1) Did the accused subjectively foresee that it could be the deceased275 behind 
the toilet door; and 
(2) Notwithstanding the foresight did he (Pistorius) then fire the shots, thereby 
reconciling himself to the possibility that it could be the deceased276 in the 
toilet? 
 
Before proceeding one has to carefully consider the first element of foresight for 
two reasons:— 
(1) A finding of recklessness for the purpose of dolus eventualis, pre-supposes 
subjective foresight of the possible consequence.277 
(2) Reckless conduct without the subjective foresight of the possible 
consequence is not sufficient to establish dolus eventualis.278 
 
Masipa J in the Pistorius279case stated: 
“The accused clearly wanted to use the firearm and the only way he could use it was to 
shoot at the perceived danger.  The intention to shoot does not necessarily include the 
intention to kill.”   
 
The one essential point of dispute remains, namely:  Did the accused have the 
required mens rea to kill the deceased when he pulled the trigger?  In other words 
was there intention.  The court, is assessing the two questions posed above 
regarding the elements of dolus eventualis, found that the evidence did not 
“support the states contention that this could be a case of dolus eventualis.”280 
 
The court referred to the case of Van der Meyden281 where the court warned 
against the danger of examining the version of the accused in isolation.  The court 
then emphasised the importance of looking at the evidence as a whole and not 
piecemeal.282 
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The reason for the emphasis on the manner in which the evidence is to be 
considered, weighed and assessed is of particular importance when applying the 
tests for dolus eventualis which is a subjective test (opposed to an objective test 
for culpa) is that it was argued by academics after the De Blom case, that the 
subjective approach would be open to abuse and fabrication.283 
 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid warning by the court to err on the side of caution 
when dealing with the subjective test for dolus eventualis and the assessment of 
the evidence before it, the court stated284 that: 
“the evidence showed that from the outset the accused believed that at the time he fired 
the shots into the toilet door, the deceased was in the bedroom while the intruders were 
in the toilet”  
 
and then the poses the following question: 
“How could the deceased reasonably have foreseen that the shots he fired would kill the 
person behind the door, let alone the deceased who he thought was in the bedroom”. 
 
Because Masipa J held that the first part of the test for dolus eventualis had not 
been satisfied285 she did not go on to consider the second element of the test which 
contain the volitional element which requires the accused to consent or reconsile 
to the foreseen consequence or to take the consequence into the bargain. 
 
Much has been written about the so-called volitional element and before 
considering this element in the context of S v Pistorius286 and the appeal287 that 
followed, the authoritive academic writings and relevant cases will be revisited to 
emphasise the key issues to be considered when dealing with the volitional 
component of the test.  
 
                                                          
283  Phelps (note 85 above) 23. 
284  S v Pistorius (note 137 above) 3328. 
285  Paizes (note 280 above) 6. 
286  S v Pistorius (note 137 above). 
287  Director of Public Prosecution v Pistorius 2016 All SA 346 (A). 
48 
 
Smith288 refers to instances which can be compared to what transpired in 
Pistorius,289 by stating that in every case where an accused is acquitted on the 
ground that he had no intention, the element found not to be present is foresight, 
leading to recklessness or, in other words the volitional element, not being 
considered or discussed. 
 
This raises the question namely should the test for dolus eventualis, consisting of 
a two-step test namely first having to determine foresight and once that has been 
established to proceed to the second step namely the volitional component, be 
redefined.  The former is the manner in which the test for dolus are generally being 
applied by courts290 and prescribed by academics291 although the test  refers to one 
test with elements.  Could the volitional component be determined independently 
from foresight in other words firstly confirming a subjective reconciliation with, 
taking into the bargain or reckless persistence while foresight is determined 
subsequently? 
 
Smith292 sites the Valachia case293 as a watershed with regard to the volitional 
element. There is hardly a single later case in which authority is given for 
requiring recklessness that does not rest directly or indirectly on the judgment of 
Greenberg JA in answering the question as to what constitute dolus eventualis.  
He stated that: 
“If the offender means to cause injury which he knows is likely to cause death and if the 
offender whether he means to kill or not, is reckless about such killing then such offender 
will have intention in the form of dolus eventualis.” 
 
Smith294 continues to distinguish recklessness as described in the Valachia case295 
from recklessness which is most often used in ordinary speech and has 
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connotations with negligence or culpa and the proof of which requires an 
objective test by considering if the reasonable person would have foreseen the 
consequence. 
 
This reminds of the question Masipa J put in the Pistorius judgement296 namely: 
“would a reasonable person in the same circumstances as the accused have foreseen the 
reasonable possibility that if he fired four shots at the door of the toilet …..”   
Which clearly is not the correct approach as the question should be what the 
accused actually foresaw. 
 
Recklessness  in the context of the volitional component is also referred to as a 
subjective state of mind with the same meaning as careless, indifference or 
persistence in conduct despite the appreciation of risk. 
 
Smith297 agrees that recklessness is a colourless concept, as stated by Burchell & 
Hunt298 having nothing to do with the accused state of mind and meaning the 
taking of a conscious risk.  Submitting that the most desirable solution is to 
abandon it altogether, further stating that while the merit of the requirement has 
not been judicially questioned, there are a number of Appellate Division 
judgments in which convictions based on dolus eventualis have been upheld, 
without finding that the appellant had been reckless299  
 
Loubser & Rabie300 in discussing S v Beukes301 stated that that case was yet 
another opportunity to examine dolus eventualis, more particularly referring to a 
difference of academic opinion on the question whether dolus eventualis requires 
not only a cognitive element of foreseeability but also a further element of 
volition.  With regard to the latter reference is once again made to the Valachia302 
case confirming that the requirement of recklessness was introduced into our law 
and further stating that courts require that an accused should simply have been 
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reckless as to whether or not303 a consequence ensue or that the accused must have 
persisted in his conduct, reckless of the consequence304 or acting with callous.305  
The important point made however makes it clear that the presence of the element 
of recklessness is, like that of the subjective foresight, is normally proved by 
inference and it is primarily inferred from the grave circumstances which flows 
from the accused and the still graver consequence which might be expected to 
flow from it.306  In this regard, referring to S v De Bruyn307 and R v Horn308 where 
the courts stated that the seriousness of the risk which an accused took would also 
be a factor from which it could be inferred that he was in a reckless frame of mind. 
 
Considering the accepted order in which the two elements of the test should be 
enquired about, it is clear that a finding of recklessness for the purpose of dolus 
eventualis presupposes a subjective foresight of the possible consequence.  S v Du 
Preez309 confirms that reckless conduct without foresight is not sufficient to 
establish dolus eventualis. 
 
The practical effect of the volitional component is discussed by Loubser & 
Rabie310 with reference to the following cases taken from Snyman.311 
 
 Chitate312 relates to an illegal abortion.  The court found that the accused had 
subjectively foreseen the possibility of death but found the volitional 
component to be absent. Due to the few incidents of fatalities the accused 
believed that death would not occur. 
 Hedley313 : the accused shot at some birds foreseeing that the bullet might 
ricochet of the water over which he was shooting and hit people in the 
background.  There was a remote chance of death which he took into the 
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bargain but subjectively concluded that it would not happen.  This conclusion 
was unreasonable, therefore he was found to be negligent.  He did not actually 
reconcile to the result therefore there was no intent. 
 Fernandez314 deals with an appellant who failed to take proper steps to prevent 
a baboon from escaping.  The court found that the appellant ought to 
reasonably have foreseen that death might result, but he did not actually 
foresee.  Due to lack of foresight and not only the absence of the volitional 
component the appellant was successful in his appeal.  
 In Le Roux315 it was clear that if there is no foresight, the case will turn on that 
point and not the point of  absence of the volitional component. 
  
The above cases also referred to in Du Preez316 confirms that the volitional 
element of the test for dolus eventualis is not considered unless subjective 
foresight of the prohibited consequence is first established. 
 
Having clearly established that in order to prove dolus eventualis the first element 
of the subjective test namely the subjective foresight of the possible occurrence 
of the prohibited result has to be established.  We revert to Masipa J in Pistorius317 
who found that the accused did not foresee as a possibility “that he would kill the 
person behind the door, let alone the deceased.”318  The judge directed her 
attention almost exclusively to the question which she considered pivotal to the 
issue of dolus eventualis, namely “Did the accused subjectively foresee that it 
could be the deceased behind the door.”319  This question refers to the deceased 
specifically which is an incorrect approach.  The broader question according to 
Paizes320 is whether the accused foresaw that he might kill the person321 behind 
the door whoever he or she may have been.  If the court had addressed the broader 
question at any length it would have come to a different answer as to the first 
element of foresight.  
                                                          
314  S v Fernandez 1966(2) SA 259 (A). 
315  S v Le Roux 1969(3) SA 725 (T). 
316  S v Du Preez (note 309 above). 
317  S v Pistorius (note 137 above) 3328. 
318  Ibid. 
319  S v Pistorius (note 137 above) . 
320  Paizes (note 280 above) 6. 




Phelps322 argues that the court’s reasoning adheres to a subjective approach to 
intention where, if the facts and evidence suggests that an accused did not foresee 
the death of the victim they cannot be held to have intended that victim’s death.  
If Pistorius had excluded the possibility that the deceased could be killed, then the 
application of the principle of error in objecto here would be to transfer his 
subjective foresight from the death of the supposed victim to the death of the 
actual victim.  Phelps323 states further that an error in objecto will only result in a 
finding of dolus (intention to kill) where as a matter of fact, (proved by the 
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt), the accused subjectively foresaw the 
possibility of killing the deceased and proceeded reckless towards that possibility.  
This argument is, with respect, incorrect and misguided in its application to the 
subjective foresight test for legal intention in a case of murder, as the principle of 
error in objecto is not a legal rule but describes a factual situation and it is wrong 
to assume that if a set of facts amount to an error in objecto that only one 
conclusion, that of guilty or not guilty, may legally be drawn.  Whether error in 
objecto excludes intention and is therefore a defence, depends upon what the 
definitional element of the particular crime are. Murder is the unlawful, 
intentional causing of death of another person.  The object of the murder, 
according to the definitional elements is therefore a human being.  Murder is 
committed any time a person unlawfully and intentionally kills a human being and 
not merely if a person kills that particular human being who he wanted to be the 
victim.  His mistake about the object of his act (error in objecto) will not exclude 
his intention, because the mistake did not relate to an element contained in the 
definition of murder.324  
 
In Pistorius325 the Supreme Court of Appeal found that Masipa J made a 
fundamental error in that the trial court’s consideration of dolus eventualis centred 
upon whether the accused knew that the person in the toilet cubicle was Reeva 
and the trial courts conclusion that dolus eventualis had not been proved was 
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premised upon that the accused had though that deceased was in the bedroom 
therefore he did not foresee that she was the person in the toilet.  Leach AJ326 
stated that what was an issue was not whether the accused had foreseen that the 
deceased might be in the cubicle when he fired the fatal shots at the toilet door, 
but whether there was a person behind the door who might possibly be killed by 
his actions.  The accused’s incorrect appreciation as to who was in the toilet is not 
determinative of whether he had the requisite criminal intent.  The trial court had 
therefore mislead itself by confining its assessment of dolus eventualis to whether 
the accused had foreseen that Reeva was behind the door. 
 
In view thereof that Masipa J had incorrectly applied the test for the first element 
of dolus eventualis, namely the subjective foresight of the possibility of killing 
whoever was behind the door of the toilet, it became relevant to include the second 
element, namely the volitional or conative element which requires that the accused 
subjectively consented to the consequence foreseen as a possibility, reconciles 
himself to it or takes it into the bargain, in the test for dolus eventualis.327 
 
In S v Dlodlo328 it was held that the subjective state of mind of an accused at the 
time of the infliction of a fatal injury is not ordinarily capable of direct proof and 
can normally only be inferred from all the circumstances leading up to and 
surrounding the infliction of the injury. 
 
In S v Dladla329 the court found the distinguishing feature of dolus eventualis to 
be the volitional component in terms of which the accused consents to the 
consequence foreseen as a possibility, he reconciles himself to it, he takes it into 
the bargain and the recklessness of which our courts often speak means no more 
than the consenting, reconciling and taking into the bargain referred to above. 
 
Loubser and Rabie330 stated that the presence of the element of recklessness is, 
like that of subjective foresight, normally proved by inference. 
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Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation.  There 
can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other 
facts which it sought to establish.331  An inference from facts is a matter of law 
and therefore a court of appeal is not bound by an inference drawn by an inferior 
court; it is entitled to enquire into the correctness of the conclusion arrived at by 
considering the same facts from which the inferior court drew the inference.332  A 
court thus draws an inference as to an accused’s state of mind from the facts which 
indicate that it was, objectively viewed, reasonably possible that the consequence 
in question would ensue and the voluntative element is normally only satisfied if 
the actor foresee the consequence as reasonably possible.333 
 
The content of the volitional element required for dolus eventualis in case law is 
uncertain.  It is acknowledged on the one hand that a positive will, wish or desire 
is not required while on the other hand, it seems, something more than a mere 
cognitive awareness of the possibility of the occurrence of the harmful result is 
required.  This intermediate state of mind in respect of the possibility of the 
harmful result is described by terms such as accepting, reconciling oneself to or 
resigning oneself to.334  
 
A further policy consideration is that if volition is required as an element of dolus 
eventualis and if such volition entails something more than foresight of the actual 
occurrence of a harmful result it would presumably be excluded by a positive will 
or desire that the result must not occur.  Loubser and Rabie335 hold the opinion 
that a voluntary withdrawal subsequent to a contribution to a foreseen unlawful 
result will not exclude guilt. 
 
In Jolly336 it was found that even if the accused did not wish for the death of the 
passengers of a train, they would still have dolus eventualis as they voluntary 
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planned and executed the derailment having knowledge of the danger.  It is 
submitted that dolus eventualis does concern the accused state of mind but only 
in a cognitive sense in that it requires a conclusion as to whether a harmful result 
may actually occur in the circumstances of each case.  It should, as Burchell and 
Hunt337 considers it, be regarded as a colourless concept. 
 
Volition is widely accepted as a constituent element of dolus eventualis and the 
content of such volition has been described in numerous ways. 
It appear that:— 
1. a positive will, wish or desire is not required but 
2. a more passive acceptance of or reconciling to the harmful result. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Humphreys338 considered the second element 
and attempted to give some guidance to its content.339 
 
S v Ndlanzi340 involves the death of a pedestrian after having being run over by 
the accused while driving a motor vehicle.  The court found that the accused had 
the subjective foresight of the consequence of his driving but it was inferred that 
he may have thought that a collision with a pedestrian would not actually occur.  
The appellant took a risk which he thought would not materialises. 
 
S v Tonkin341 is another case where specific enquiry is made into the second or 
conative element of dolus eventualis.  The court once again refers to 
Humphreys.342 
 
Returning to the process of inferential reasoning to determine the state of mind of 
the accused, the supreme court of appeal in S v P343 confirmed that “the better 
approach is to think one’s way through all the facts before seeking to draw any 
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relevant inferences.”344  The court prefers to look at all the facts and from that 
totality to ascertain whether the inference in question can be drawn.345 
 
In S v Beukes en Ander346 the court stated that the chances of an accused admitting,  
or of it appearing from other evidence, that he had indeed foreseen a remote 
consequence are very thin and a court draws an inference concerning an accused’s 
state of mind from the facts which point to it being, reasonably possible, 
objectively seen, that the consequence would eventuate.  The court further held347 
that:  
“if such a possibility does not exist it is simply accepted that the actor did not become 
conscious of the consequence.  If it does exist it is usually inferred from the mere fact of 
him taking action that he took that consequence into account.”348 
 
In the Pistorius appeal the prosecution argued349 that the following factual 
findings should be taken into account in answering the question whether the trial 
court correctly applied the principles of dolus eventualis: 
 The Respondent armed himself with a loaded firearm and approached what 
he thought was danger with the firearm ready to shoot. 
 He knew where he kept his firearm which was on the opposite side of the bed 
where he slept on the evening of the accident. 
 The Respondent passed the bedroom door on his way to the bathroom. 
 The Respondent walked from the bedroom to the bathroom. 
 He had to cock his firearm. 
 The Respondent while on his stumps fired four shots at the toilet door. 
 Three of the four shots struck the deceased and she died as a result of multiple 
gunshot wounds. 
 The toilet door was hinged to open outwards, into the bathroom and was 
locked from the inside. 
 The Respondent knew there was a person behind the door. 
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 The Respondent fired not one but four shots into the toilet door. 
 The accused clearly wanted to use the firearm and the only way he could have 
used it was firing at the perceived danger. 
 
The appellant continues the argument by stating that the trial court, during 
sentencing expanded on the accepted facts, confirming the following findings:350 
 The Respondent knew there was a person behind the door when he fired the 
shots. 
 The Respondent deliberately fired shots into the door with the aim to shoot the 
intruder. 
 The Respondent knew when firing that the toilet was a small cubicle and an 
intruder would have no room to manoeuvre or escape. 
 The Respondent was trained in the use of a firearm. 
 
The appellant conclude its argument before the court by submitting that:351  
“the only conceivable finding based on the abovementioned facts could, at a minimum be 
that, in arming himself, walking to the bathroom with the intention to shoot whilst 
knowing that there was a person behind the closed door of a small cubicle and 
intentionally firing four shots, should be that he intended to kill the person in the cubicle.” 
 
The application of the principles of dolus eventualis, namely: 
(a) a subjective foresight of the consequences of his actions; and 
(b) the reconciliation or taking into the bargain of that consequence or being 
reckless towards the foreseen result352  
can in view of the above only result in a finding that the respondent acted with 
dolus eventualis. 
 
With regard to the circumstantial evidence Masipa J states in the judgment353 in 
relation to the murder charge that “the evidence is purely circumstantial” and then 
continues to state that the fundamental rule considering circumstantial evidence 
is that in order to justify an inference of guilt a court must be sure that inculpatory 
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facts are incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of 
explanation on any other reasonable hypotheses and other finding that “viewed in 
the totality of the evidence failed to establish that the accused had the requisite 
intention to kill the deceased.”354 
 
Masipa J stated with reference to the evidence355 “The court is however entitled 
to look at the evidence as a whole and the circumstances of the case to determine 
the presence or absence of intention at the time of the incident” however when 
dealing with the question of dolus eventualis356 Masipa J then states that “the 
evidence before the court does not support the states contention that this could be 
a case of dolus eventualis.” 
 
Circumstantial evidence often forms an important component of the information 
before a court.357  Circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker than direct 
evidence358 and in some cases can be of more value than direct evidence.359 
 
In R v De Villiers360 it was stated that circumstantial evidence should be assessed 
as follows: 
“The court must not take each circumstance separately and give the accused the benefit 
of any reasonable doubt as to the inference to be drawn from each one so taken.  It must 
carefully weigh the cumulative effect of all of them together and it is only after it has done 
so that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt which it may have 
as to whether the inference of guilt is the only inference which can be reasonably drawn.” 
 
In S v Latchman361 it was stated that circumstantial evidence should never be 
approached in a piecemeal fashion.  The evidence should be considered in totality. 
 
                                                          
354  Ibid 3324. 
355  Ibid 3328. 
356  Ibid 3329. 
357  SE van der Merwe Evidence Juta 1ed. 1983 36. 
358  Ibid 404. 
359  Ibid 404. 
360  R v de Villiers 1944 AD 508-509. 
361  S v Latchman 2010(2) SACR 52 (SCA) para 40. 
59 
 
In S v Libazi362 it was stated that it is true that a trial court must consider the totality 
of the evidence to determine if the guilt of any accused person has been proved 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
In Chabalala363 it was stated: 
“the correct approach is to weigh up all elements which point towards the guilt of the 
accused against all those which are indicative of his innocence, taking proper account of 
inherent strengths and weaknesses probabilities and improbabilities on both sides and 
having done so to decide whether the balance weighs so heavily in favour of the state as 
to exclude any reasonable doubt of to the accused’s guilt.” 
 
and in S v Trainor:364 
“A conspectus of all the evidence is required.  Evidence which  is reliable should be 
weighed alongside such evidence as may be found false, independently verifiable 
evidence if any should be weighed to see if it supports any of the evidence tendered”. 
 
The appellant in its Main Heads of Argument states365 that the court focused on 
the screaming and sounds and failed to evaluate all the circumstantial evidence 
holistically and merely ignored the bulk of the evidence of the crime scene and 
more specifically the bedroom and the toilet cubicle reconstruction which in the 
view of the appellant is the gravest misdirection and a clear mistake of law in the 
application of legal principles pertaining to circumstantial evidence. 
 
In S v Brown366 the court espoused Snyman’s367 definition of dolus eventualis 
stating that  
“dolus eventualis is defined as a person is acting with intention in the form of dolus 
eventualis if the commission of the unlawful act or the causing of the unlawful result is 
not the main aim but 
(a) he subjectively foresees the possibility that in striving towards his main aim, the 
unlawful act may be committed or the unlawful result may be caused and 
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(b) he reconciles himself to this possibility”  
 
then proceeding:  
“another way of describing (b) is to say that X was reckless as to whether the act may be 
committed or the result may ensue.  However it does not matter whether component (b) 
is described in terms of reconciliation with the possibility or in terms of recklessness.” 
 
The appellant368 argued that dolus eventualis was proved369 if the accused foresaw 
a risk of death however slight, but nevertheless decides to take a chance and 
gambles with the life of the deceased reckless to the consequence, arguing that 
such a state of mind on the part of the accused can be inferred objectively from 
the totality of all the facts. 
 
3.2 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal : Director of Public Prosecutions, 
Gauteng v Pistorius370 
The appeal was brought following the trial courts verdict that the accused was not 
guilty of murder.  In summary: 
 The trial court did take into account that the accused clearly wanted to use 
the firearm371 but “that the intention to shoot however does not necessarily 
include the intention to kill.”   
 The trial court found that in viewing the evidence in totality, the evidence failed 
to establish that the accused had the requisite intention (dolus directus) to kill the 
deceased.372 
 The trial court then proceeded to consider dolus eventualis or legal intent, 
however in asking the questions on foreseeability and reconciliation with the 
foreseen consequence, the court specifically considered the two elements as 
follows: 
(1) did the accused subjectively foresee that it could be the deceased behind 
the door, and 
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370  Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius (2016) 1 All SA 346 (SCA). 
371 S v Pistorius (note 137 above) para. 3319. 
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(2) did he reconcile himself to the possibility that it could be the deceased in 
the toilet.373 
 The court then stated: 
“The evidence before this court does not support the states contention that the accused 
was guilty of murder with intent in the form of dolus eventualis.”374 
 
In the judgment375 and referring to Count 1 – Murder, Masipa J found that the 
evidence led by the state was purely circumstantial and also weak circumstantial 
evidence.  The court viewed the evidence given by the witnesses as unreliable, 
however, and not withstanding stating in the judgement that the accused was a 
“very poor witness” and an “evasive witness” and also an “untruthful” witness, 
the court found376 that he had no intention to kill. 
 
The accused was found guilty of culpable homicide which is distinguished from 
intention in that the test for negligence or culpa is objective namely what would 
the so-called reasonable person or bonus paterfamilias have done in a similar 
situation.377  In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act378, culpable homicide is a 
component verdict on a charge of murder.  The court thus found on considering 
all the evidence that the state had not proved that the accused was guilty of murder, 
but of culpable homicide. 
 
The appeal was based on the state’s contention that the trial court had erred on 
certain legal issues in particular arguing that the principles of dolus eventualis 
were not correctly applied to the accepted facts and the conduct of the accused.  
The appeal was brought in respect of a question of law in terms of Section 319 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act.379  The appeal court cannot interfere with any factual 
decision that the trail court has made such as rejecting the state’s version on issued 
relating to dolus eventualis380 in other words the rejected version cannot be 
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reconsidered.  The appeal court thus considered if the trial court had errored in 
regard to the issue of dolus eventualis, in its application of the law to the proved 
and accepted facts. 
 
With reference to Snyman381 and Burchell382 dolus eventualis or legal intent is 
clearly one of three forms of intention, but has received by far the most attention 
of all the forms of intention383 and is according to Hoctor384 manifestly the most 
important form of intention in practice in South African law. 
 
As stated by Leach JA385 dolus eventualis, although a straightforward concept, 
differs from dolus directus (where the object and purpose of the perpetrator is 
specifically to cause death) in that with dolus eventualis the risk of death, is 
foreseen, in other words the perpetrator does not mean to bring about death or 
unlawful consequence, but foresees the possibility but proceeds with his 
conduct.386 
 
Notwithstanding the statement above by the appeal court387 that dolus eventualis 
is a straightforward concept Loubser and Rabie388 stated that, although the concept 
of dolus eventualis has been the subject of innumerable reported judgments over 
several decades and almost as many academic publications, there is still no 
certainty as to its content. 
 
Leach AJ stated with regard to the foresight that it is necessary to stress that the 
wrongdoer does not have to foresee death as a probable consequence of his 
actions.  It is sufficient that only the possibility of death is foreseen. 
 
The varied points of view on the degree of foresight required has been discussed 
above with reference to Hoctor389 who concluded that attempts to distinguish 
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between a foresight of a very remote possibility, fairly remote possibility, real, 
substantial and concrete possibility is derived from a mistaken conflation of issues 
of proof and issues of principle and that it would be far more sensible to consider 
the cognitive component (foresight) to simply be established in terms of actual 
subjective possibility of harm.  Holding someone liable for acting despite 
subjective foresight of a possibility of harm, whatever the degree of foresight, is 
in accordance with both the South African criminal law and the constitution 
underpinning it. 
 
Paizes390 proposes, in the light of the difficulties experienced by the courts, that it 
is not ordinarily desirable to hold that an accused has dolus eventualis where he 
sees the possibility of his conduct causing the unlawful consequence as no more 
than remote or slight although he acknowledge that there are statements by our 
courts that foresight of a remote or slight possibility is sufficient for legal intention 
although it appears that the courts in practice insist on a foresight of more than 
remote or slight possibility.  There may however be exceptional cases where 
foresight of a possibility, however remote, should be viewed as sufficient. 
 
According to Loubser and Rabie391 it is now, after some uncertainty, established 
law that what must be foreseen is only the possibility and not necessarily the 
probability or the likelihood of the result.  Remoteness of the possibility is relevant 
in drawing an inference of the accused’s subjective foresight of that possibility, 
the more remote the possibility the less likely that the accused did foresee.392 
 
The second element which Leach AJ described as a reconciliation with the 
foreseen possibility393 has been expressed in various ways, as have also been 
discussed above. 
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In Humphreys394 Brand JA refers to the second element as the perpetrator 
consenting to the foreseen possibility, he reconciles to it, he takes it into the 
bargain or the perpetrator is reckless to the consequence. 
 
In considering the abovementioned second element in the test for dolus eventualis, 
three aspects needs to be emphasised regarding the volitional component.   
(a).  Firstly, the reference to the element as an accused being reckless as to 
whether a foreseen consequence would ensue or not.  The requirement for 
recklessness was effectively introduced into our law by R v Valachia395 
where the court relied on the Native Territorial Code396 and also discussed 
above with reference to Smith397 as also quoted by Loubser & Rabie.398 
 
In certain cases the court required the recklessness to be in respect of the accused 
being reckless towards the consequence occurring or not399 opposed to other 
cases400 where the accused must have persisted in his course of conduct reckless 
as to the consequence thereof.  In S v De Bruyn401 dolus eventualis was found to 
be present where the accused foresaw the possibility of death but was reckless of 
its fulfilment.  Most of the concepts used by the courts to indicate recklessness 
seem to be synonymous in other words reckless means careless or regardless and 
regardless means indifferent.  Burchell and Hunt402 and Smith403 refer to 
recklessness as a colourless concept only describing a state of mind.  Could this 
description refer to a state of mind that is emotionless towards the foreseen result 
or have a neutral attitude to the foreseen result or consequence?  The volume and 
variety of terminology used to describe the element of volition or recklessness 
towards a foreseen result in establishing the second element for dolus eventualis 
illustrates that the concept of volition is capable of a wide range of meanings, from 
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a positive desire on the one end to a passive or reluctant attitude at the other.  What 
appears to be required is a passive acceptance of the foreseen consequence, rather 
than a positive will or desire for the consequence to occur.  As stated above the 
perpetrator does not mean for the consequence to occur but does foresee it but 
remains neutral to its actual occurrence.   
 
Humphreys404 confirms what was stated earlier namely that the recklessness 
referred to as the volitional component of the test for dolus eventualis should not 
be misunderstood as the equivalent of recklessness in the sense of aggravated 
negligence.  Negligence is determined objectively while recklessness in the 
context of dolus eventualis is established by determining what the subjective state 
of mind of the accused was towards a foreseen consequence. 
 
The court of appeal in Pistorius405 considered the two questions asked by Masipa J 
in the judgment406 when the learned judge stated that she: 
“now deals with dolus eventualis namely did the accused subjectively foresee that it could 
be the deceased behind the door and when firing the shots at the door did he reconcile 
him that it could be the deceased in the toilet.”407 
 
and  
“How could the accused reasonably have foreseen that the shots he fired would kill the 
deceased?” 
 
The appeal court (SCA) found that the aforesaid reasoning is confusing in various 
aspects, firstly dealing with the question “How could the accused reasonably have 
foreseen” and stating that Masipa J wrongly applied an objective rather than a 
subjective approach to the question of dolus.  The question, following the 
subjective approach would have been to ask what did the accused actually 
foresaw.  The distinction must be made as to what actually went on in the mind of 
the accused and not what would or should have gone on in the mind of the 
reasonable person in the position of the accused.  The distinction between 
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subjective foresight and objective foreseeability must not become blurred.408  The 
court also pointed out that the trial court’s reasoning further conflates the test to 
be applied for dolus directus and dolus eventualis by firstly, presumably with the 
test for dolus eventualis in mind, finding that the accused had not subjectively 
foreseen that he would kill whoever was behind the door and then stating that if 
he intended to kill the person (dolus directus) he, the accused, would have aimed 
higher. 
 
The appeal409 was brought on authority of Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.410  The state can only reserve a question of law on appeal.  The findings by 
the trial court is, as far as it relates to the manner in which the two questions on 
(foreseeability and reconciliation) the proof dolus eventualis was set out and 
interpreted, goes to the heart of the question of law which was reserved by the 
state, namely whether the principles of dolus eventualis were properly applied.  
The questions asked by Masipa J centred upon whether the accused knew that the 
person in the toilet cubicle was the deceased, Reeva and its conclusion that dolus 
eventualis had not been proved premised upon an acceptance that, as he had 
thought Reeva was in the bedroom, he did not foresee that she was the person in 
the toilet.411  Phelps412 who supports the decision of the trial court, is wrong in her 
argument regarding error in objecto when quoting the following from the 
judgment413  
“We are clearly dealing with error in objecto in that the blow was meant for the person 
behind the door, who the accused believed was an intruder.  The blow struck and killed 
the person behind the door.  The fact that the person behind the door turned out to be the 
deceased and not the intruder is irrelevant”. 
 
Leach JA found that the above argument and the trial court’s reasoning regarding  
error in objecto (having not foreseen that it was Reeva in the toilet) is a 
misdirection as to the appropriate legal issues.  What was an issue was not whether 
the accused had foreseen that Reeva might be in the cubicle when he fired the fatal 
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shots at the door, but whether there was a person behind the door who might 
possibly be killed.  A person may have the intention to kill and such intention 
must relate to a person killed, but this does not mean that a perpetrator must know 
or appreciate the identity of the victim.  A perpetrator can therefore act with dolus 
indeterminatus simultaneously with dolus eventualis414 as dolus indeterminatus is 
not a form of intent but indicates that the intent of the perpetrator was directed to 
an unknown person.415 
 
As pointed out previously, Paizes416 stated that if Masipa J asked the broader 
question when making the enquiry into foresight by the accused namely did he 
subjectively foresee that it was a person behind the door, instead of the deceased 
Reeva, and if that question was answered in the affirmative, then the second part 
of the test for dolus eventualis namely the volitional element which required the 
accused to reconcile himself with or take the foreseen consequence into the 
bargain, would become pertinent. 
 
The SCA found that the trial court had misdirected itself with regard to the 
question on foreseeability, therefore the volitional element now becomes relevant 
and requires the test to be extended to include that component. 
 
(b).  The second aspect with regard to the volitional element of the test for dolus 
eventualis that requires consideration is the proof thereof by assessing  the 
proved facts and circumstantial evidence and applying the principles of 
inferential reasoning.  Leach AJ stated that a further issue which arises in 
respect of dolus eventualis on the point of law reserved by the appellant is 
the question whether circumstantial evidence were correctly applied. 
 
The trial court417 did emphasise the importance of looking at the evidence as a 
whole and not piecemeal.  The process of reasoning which is appropriate to the 
application of the proper test in a particular case will depend on the nature of the 
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evidence the court has before it.  The fundamental rule in considering 
circumstantial evidence is that in order to justify an inference of guilt a court must 
be sure that inculpatory facts are incompatible with the innocence of the 
accused.418 
 
To determine the subjective state of mind of an accused is very difficult.  It is 
seldom possible to be done by direct evidence therefore a court have to also rely 
on proof by inferential reasoning where inferences are drawn from the accused 
conduct.419 
 
Leach JA in Pistorius420 refers to S v Dlodlo421 and points out that the subjective 
state of mind of an accused person such as in the Pistorius case is an issue of fact 
that can often only be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the infliction 
of the fatal injury and the inference properly drawn must be consistent with all the 
proved facts and then, referring to what was stated by Nugent J in Van der 
Meyden422 namely that the court must keep in mind that the conclusion which is 
reached must take all the evidence into account although some of it might be found 
to be false, unrealistic or possibly false or unrealistic.  None may be simply 
ignored. 
 
In S v De Bruyn,423 Holmes AJ emphasises that what is needed in determining the 
subjective state of mind of an accused, is down to earth reasoning which involves 
looking at all the facts, allowing for human factors, but guarding against armchair 
reasoning. 
 
With specific reference to proof of the second component of dolus eventualis 
Brand JA while applying the principle of inferential reasoning stated that if it can 
be reasonably inferred that the appellant may have thought that subjectively 
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foreseen consequence would not actually occur, then the volitional element of 
dolus eventualis would not have been established. 
 
(c).   Thirdly, consideration has to be given to the arguments raised by 
academics, that the volitional element is superfluous in the test for dolus 
eventualis.  Whiting424 stated:  
“It is superfluous, because by acting with foresight of the possibility that a result 
will ensue, one necessarily reconciles oneself to the possibility that it will ensue 
and takes the possibility into the bargain”. 
 
Paizes criticised the judgements referred to below with regard to the volitional 
element stating that these cases are seeking to unjustifiably to add ballast to what 
is a tautological enquiry.425   The argument being that an accused who goes ahead 
with an act that he foresees might bring about an unlawful consequence, must 
necessarily have taken the risk of causing that consequence into the bargain.  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed the existence and acceptance of the 
volitional component in S v Humphreys426, S v Tonkin427 and S v Ndlanzi.428 
 
The crux of the argument as to the relevance or not of the volitional component 
as the second element in the test for dolus eventualis appears to hinge on the 
degree of subjective foresight that is required.   
 
Burchell429 states that the conative component of dolus eventualis should be 
rejected as irrelevant and confusing and there are no decisions of the South 
African courts where the verdict has turned on the recklessness requirement.430  
This latter argument is no longer applicable with reference to the aforesaid cases 
in particular that of Humphreys . 
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The volitional component or element of recklessness and the various synonyms, 
reconciliation with, consent to and persistence in conduct, have been referred to 
frequently by our courts but it has seldom been of practical importance in the sense 
that dolus eventualis was explicitly found to be lacking if there was no 
recklessness, which was almost automatically inferred if there was foresight.  The 
opposite being that if foresight was absent the volitional component was not 
further considered. 
 
The two points in law that the state reserved on appeal were: 
 whether the trial court correctly applied the principles of dolus eventualis to 
the proved facts, and 
 whether the legal principles applicable to circumstantial evidence were 
correctly applied to the evidence by the trial court. 
 
The questions reserved is clearly an overlap between fact and law as the 
assessment of circumstantial evidence impacts on the principles applicable to the 
proof of dolus eventualis  when establishing: 
 foresight 
 proving recklessness or reconciliation with the foreseen consequences. 
 
It is clearly emphasised above that foresight and recklessness, in this appeal, had 
to be proved by inference, by considering the proved facts and circumstantial 
evidence as a whole. 
 
The appeal court431 found that in the present instance, although the question of the 
accused’s intention at the relevant time is one of fact, to be determined by 
inference, there appears to have been an absence of appreciation by the trial court 
of material evidence.  The trial court failed to take into account the evidence of 
Captain Mangema, whose evidence proved that all the shots fired through the door 
would almost inevitably have struck a person behind it.  Effectively there was no 
place for the deceased to hide.  The evidence led by Captain Mangema on the 
Black Talon ammunition confirmed that it was specifically designed for self-
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defence as the bullet would penetrate a hard object but mushroom when entering 
soft flesh causing devastating wounds.  This evidence, although circumstantial, 
was crucial in the decision on whether the accused, at the time he fired the four 
shots through the door foresaw and reconciled himself to this result.  He must 
have and therefore did foresee the potentially fatal consequences of his action.  If 
this evidence was not ignored in answering the question on foreseeability the 
court’s decision on the presence of dolus eventualis might have been different. 
 
The pertinent issue then arises whether, on the primary facts found proved 
considering all the evidence and applying the correct legal tests, the inference has 
to be drawn that the accused acted with dolus eventualis when he fired the fatal 
shots. 
 
The volitional or second element of the test for dolus eventualis as stated by 
Loubser and Rabie432 is usually automatically inferred if foresight is proved but 
as shown in Humphreys433 this is not always the case.  The following observation 
was also made by Brand JA434   
“Like any other fact, subjective foresight can be proved by inference, moreover common 
sense dictates that the process of inferential reasoning may start out from the premise 
that, in accordance with common human experience the possibility of the consequence 
that ensued would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence.  The next 
logical step would then be to ask whether, in the light of all the facts and circumstances 
of the case, there is any reason to think that the appellant would not have shared this 
foresight, derived from common human experience, with other members of the general 
population.” 
 
On the accused’s own version of the events as summarised by Masipa J in the 
judgment,435 the respondent thought there was an intruder in the toilet, he armed 
himself with a heavy calibre firearm loaded with ammunition specifically 
designed for self-defence, screamed at the intruder to get out of the house and 
proceeded forward to the bathroom in order to confront whoever might be there.  
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He was holding the firearm ready to shoot, paused at the entrance to the bathroom 
and when he became aware that there was a person in the toilet cubicle, he fired 
four shots through the door and never offered an acceptable explanation for having 
done so. 
 
The learned judge continued  
“as a matter of common sense436 at the time the fatal shots were fired, the possibility of 
death of the person behind the door was clearly an obvious result, that inference is 
irresistible”. 
 
Concluding that when firing the fatal shots the accused must have foreseen and 
did foresee, that whoever was behind the toilet door might die, but reconciled 
himself to that event occurring and gambled with that person’s life.  These actions 
constituted dolus eventualis.437 
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Conclusion is defined as the last main division of a speech, lecture or essay438 or 
the opinion one has after considering all the information about something.439 
 
This paper investigated and discussed dolus eventualis as a form of intent in 
particular the importance and relevance of the conative element, also described as 
the volitional component, being the so-called second element in the test to proof 
legal intent (dolus eventualis).  This was done in conjunction with the cognitive 
component or first element namely the subjective foresight of a prohibited 
consequence.  The investigation was done against the background of 
S v Pistorius440 and DPP v Pistorius441 in which the question of dolus eventualis 
was central. 
 
The trial court was held in the High Court of South Africa Gauteng Division, 
Pretoria before the honourable judge Masipa and two assessors and the court 
found that: 
“the accused could not be found guilty of murder dolus eventualis on the basis that, from 
the accused’s belief and conduct, it could not be said that he foresaw that either the 
deceased or anyone else for that matter, might be killed when he fired the shots at the 
toilet door.  It also could not be said that he accepted that possibility into the bargain.”442 
 
The appeal by the state to the Supreme Court of Appeal before five judges who 
unanimously found per Leach JA: 
“In these circumstances I have no doubt that in firing the fatal shots, the accused must 
have foreseen and therefore did foresee, that whoever was behind the toilet door might 
die, but reconciled himself to that event occurring and gambled with that person’s life.  
This constituted dolus eventualis on his part….”443 
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Before attempting to explain the above discrepancy and come to a conclusion on 
what has been dissected, investigated and discussed above one has to remind 
oneself that although the concept of dolus eventualis has been the subject of 
innumerable reported judgments and as many academic publications there is, as 
is clear from the two conflicting verdicts, no certainty as to its contents.444  
Notwithstanding the clear and obvious uncertainty regarding the contents of dolus 
eventualis it remains by far the most important form of intention in practice in 
South African criminal law445 and there is no more fundamental concept in South 
African criminal law.446 
 
The paper dealt with dolus eventualis in broad terms with an emphasis on the 
volitional component.  The conclusion was however very soon (after research of 
law and academic writings), reached that until recently447 the volitional element 
of dolus eventualis was sometimes viewed as superfluous and in a sense vague 
due to the various descriptions and terminology by which it was referred to such 
as “recklessness”, “consent to”, “persistence in”, “reconciliation with” and 
“taking into the bargain” of the prohibited consequence.  The conclusion is that 
any discussion or research of the volitional element has to take place in broad 
terms, having consideration for various other aspects that are relevant to the proof 
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The table clearly emphasises that there are two important components that are 
central in proving dolus eventualis and that the volitional component, which has 
in the past been viewed as redundant448 or superfluous449 by some academics, are 
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in fact essential in proving dolus eventualis.  This seems to also be the viewpoint 
of the Supreme Court in recent cases450 and is also confirmed by Snyman.451 
 
The two components, central in proving dolus eventualis are 
(1) the application of a subjective test, opposed to the objective test which is 
applied for culpa, and 
(2)  the principles applicable to the making of inferences from proved facts and 
circumstantial evidence. 
 
Although the application of the two aspects in the proof of dolus eventualis is trite 
law, their joint importance in the proof of the volitional component of the test of 
dolus has to be acknowledged by academics and applied by the courts with more 
down to earth reasoning452 and properly considering all the evidence relevant to 
an issue.453  This should leads a court to a point where “as a matter of common 
sense” the inferences drawn from the facts or circumstantial evidence, is 
irresistible. 
 
The South African Courts embrace the psychological concept of culpability in 
terms of which the question whether an accused has acted intentionally depends 
solely on his subjective state of mind454 as referred to by Hoctor.455 
 
In terms of the psychological concept, fault (skuld) (which consist of culpa 
(negligence) and dolus (intent)) is a state of mind456 opposed to the normative 
concept in terms of which blameworthiness is measured against a norm, in other 
words an outside standard.457 
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In view of the aforegoing it is further concluded that although the subjective state 
of mind of the perpetrator is determined by a proof of foresight.  The actual 
subjective state of mind and therefore the complete proof of dolus eventualis is 
reached by proving the volitional component. 
 
The importance of the volitional component firstly lies therein that the foresight 
component is vague and subject to much debate due to the question on the degree 
of foresight and secondly that the foresight component addresses the cognitive or 
“knowledge” element and not the conative (will) element.  The “will” element 
needs to be addressed to complete the test and thereby confirming the principles 
of the psychological concept of fault. 
 
The second aspect central to finding dolus eventualis, and considering the 
importance of the volitional component is the proof that the accused did in fact in 
his mind reconcile himself to the result by inferences made from the proved facts 
and circumstantial evidence which has to be considered in totality.  The finding 
must account for all the evidence.458  
 
In DPP v Pistorius459 the appeal court through a proper consideration of the 
proved facts and circumstantial evidence and by proper application of the 
principles of inferential reasoning not only turned over the judgment of the trial 
court by finding that the proved facts and evidence proved: 
(1)  foresight of the consequence, and 
(2)  reconciliation with the consequence  
but also reiterated the importance of the aforesaid two phased test for dolus 
eventualis. 
 
Although Oscar Pistorius460 appeal to the Constitutional Court was refused, it may 
be pertinent to, make reference to what was written by David Jesse461 about the 
questions which might have been considered by the Constitutional Court if the 
                                                          
458  S v Van der Meyden (note 281 above) 449 – 450. 
459  DPP v Pistorius (note 385 above). 
460  S v Pistorius (note 137 above). 




appeal was allowed.  He is of the opinion that the SCA overstepped its bounds of 
authority and ultra vires the Constitution of the country by re-examining facts, 
under the pretence of dealing with a question of law and that the finding of dolus 
eventualis was misplaced. 
 
The final conclusion is that to prove adaequatio intellectus et rei (the 
correspondence of the mind and reality) as far as it relates to dolus eventualis 
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